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Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, September 24, 1975

Washington, D. C.

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TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

James Angleton, Former Intelligence Agency Official 573

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

- - -

Wednesday, September 24, 1975

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart (Colorado), Tower, Baker, Mathias, and Schweiker.

Also Present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick Schwarz and Curtis R. Smothers, Professional Staff.

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The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.

Yesterday the Committee commenced its inquiry into the Huston Plan, our witness being Mr. Huston. And it developed in the testimony that several illegal proposals had been made to the President -- in this case, Mr. Nixon -- that he had approved those proposals, and later, had revoked his approval. But that the very activities for which authority was sought, had in fact been going on for a long period of time prior to the submission of the proposals to the President.

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1 The evidence also showed that once the President had
2 revoked the proposals, about five days after he had first
3 approved them, the activities, nevertheless, continued, and
4 in some cases, were expanded.

5 Mr. Huston testified that Mr. Nixon was not aware of these
6 activities, either before or after his approval and revocation.
7 One of the illegal activities was the opening of the mail by
8 the CIA, and this Committee will look into that mail opening
9 program extensively. It is a very serious matter, and we have
10 hearings scheduled a few weeks from now, at the end of which
11 we will inquire in detail about the mail opening program.

12 We will want to know, for example, why the mail of such
13 individuals and organizations in this country as the Ford
14 Foundation, Harvard University, the Rockefeller Foundation, was
15 regularly opened by the CIA, or the mail coming to or from
16 such individuals as Arthur Burns, Bella Abzug, Jay Rockefeller,
17 Martin Luther King, Mrs. Martin Luther King, Richard Nixon
18 himself, as well as such Senators as Hubert Humphrey, Edward
19 Kennedy, even the Chairman of this Committee, whose letter to
20 my mother is in the file, should have been regularly opened
21 and scrutinized by the CIA against the laws of the country.

22 And so today, our objective is not to look at this mail
23 program in great detail, for we will do that later. But it is,
24 rather, to examine the lack of accountability within the Agency
25 and the failure to keep the President of the United States

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1 properly advised of such activities, a core issue, if we are
2 going to reform the intelligence agencies and law enforcement
3 agencies of the Federal government and make them properly
4 responsible to and accountable for their actions, the elected
5 representatives of the people, chief among whom, of course, is
6 the President himself.

7 Now with that brief introduction to the general topic for
8 the day, I would like to ask our witness, Mr. Angleton -- who,
9 I understand, is represented by Counsel -- to take the oath.
10 Before I ask you to take the oath, Mr. Angleton, I wonder
11 if your attorney would identify himself for the record.

12 Mr. Brown. Yes, Mr. Chairman, my name is John T. Brown,
13 Counsel for Mr. Angleton in these proceedings.

14 The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Brown.

15 Mr. Angleton, would you please stand to take the oath?

16 Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will
17 give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth,
18 and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

19 Mr. Angleton. I do.

20 The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, would you please begin the
21 questioning?

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1 TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON, FORMER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
2 AGENCY OFFICIAL

3 ACCOMPANIED BY: JOHN T. BROWN, COUNSEL FOR MR. ANGLETON
4 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Angleton, were you employed by the CIA
5 in 1970?

6 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I was.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Can you keep your voice up? It is hard to
8 hear you.

9 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I was.

10 Mr. Schwarz. What was your job at that time?

11 Mr. Angleton. I was Chief of the Counterintelligence
12 Staff.

13 Mr. Schwarz. And when did you start working for the CIA?

14 Mr. Angleton. I began in 1947, having come from OSS.

15 Mr. Schwarz. You knew, Mr. Angleton, did you not, that
16 the CIA was opening mail in New York City in 1970, and had
17 been doing so for approximately 15 or 20 years?

18 Mr. Angleton. I did.

19 Mr. Brown. Mr. Schwarz, pardon me. If I may interrupt
20 for just a moment.

21 As I indicated to the Counsel for the Committee, Mr.
22 Angleton had a very brief opening statement which he wished
23 to make, and I would like, at this time, to ask for the
24 opportunity to have him make that statement, if I may.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Yes, I'm sorry. You did not say that to me, and

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1 I'm very sorry. Would you go ahead?

2 Mr. Angleton. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
3 My name is James Angleton. I am appearing before the Committee
4 today, freely and without subpoena. I am mindful of the serious
5 issues facing the Committee, and I know of your concern that
6 they be resolved prudently and expeditiously.

7 I have served in the intelligence community of the United
8 States for 31 years, beginning with the OSS during World War II.

9 In 1954, I became Chief of the Counterintelligence Activities
10 of CIA, a position which I held until 1974. I am now retired.

11 My years of service have convinced me that the strength
12 of the United States lies in its capacity to sustain perpetual
13 yet peaceful revolution. It is the ultimate function of the
14 intelligence community, as part of our government, to maintain
15 and enhance the opportunity for peaceful change.

16 I believe most strongly that the efforts and motivations
17 of the intelligence community have contributed to the sustaining
18 of a nation of diversity and strength.

19 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Angleton.

21 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Angleton, if we could just get back to
22 where we were.

23 You just said, did you not, that you knew in 1970, and
24 had known for a substantial period of time, that the CIA was
25 opening mail in New York City?

1 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

2 Mr. Schwarz. And Director Helms knew that, did he not?

3 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

4 Mr. Schwarz. And J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, knew
5 that, did he not?

6 Mr. Angleton. I would assume so, sir.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Well, I will read to you what Mr. Helms said
8 in his deposition of last week.

9 "Mr. Hoover knew all about the mail operations."

10 Now, you have no reason to doubt that, do you?

11 Mr. Angleton. I do not.

12 Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Sullivan of the FBI knew all about
13 the CIA's mail opening program, did he not?

14 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover and Mr. Sullivan
16 and yourself were all involved in the process which has come
17 to be known as the Huston Plan, is that correct?

18 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

19 Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover signed the Plan,
20 did they not?

21 Mr. Angleton. They did.

22 Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Sullivan was the primary drafter,
23 but you and other working persons contributed to the drafting
24 of the report, did you not?

25 Mr. Angleton. Correct.

1 Mr. Schwarz. All right.

2 Would you turn, Mr. Angleton, to page 29 of the Special
3 Report, Interagency Committee on Ad Hoc, June 1970.

4 Now that is talking about mail coverage, isn't it?

5 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

6 Mr. Schwarz. And it distinguishes between routine coverage
7 and covert coverage, saying routine coverage is legal and
8 covert coverage is illegal, is that correct?

9 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And by covert coverage, they meant opening
11 the mail, did they not?

12 Mr. Angleton. Exactly.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record the first
14 sentence under the heading "Nature of Restrictions" please?

15 Mr. Angleton. "Covert coverage has been discontinued
16 while routine coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth
17 of publicity arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage
18 during legal proceedings and publicity afforded this matter
19 in Congressional hearings involving accusations of governmental
20 invasion of privacy."

21 Mr. Schwarz. Now the first five words say "covert
22 coverage has been discontinued", and, as you just agreed a
23 moment ago, that states that the opening of mail has been
24 discontinued, isn't that right?

25 Mr. Angleton. May I seek a little clarification, please?

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1 I believe that if you read the contribution under
2 Preliminary Discussion, we are faced with two problems. We
3 are faced with the problem of domestic mail that goes from one
4 point in the United States to another point in the United States.

5 The CIA activity was devoted to mail to the United States
6 from Communist countries, and to Communist countries from
7 the United States. So there are two degrees of opening.

8 In other words, the entire intent and motivation of the
9 program, as conducted by CIA, involved the question of foreign
10 entanglements, counterintelligence objectives.

11 The domestic mail program was a program that had been
12 conducted at some time or another by the FBI.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Angleton, would you answer my question?

14 The words "covert coverage has been discontinued"; covert
15 there means opening mail, isn't that right?

16 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

17 Mr. Schwarz. I will read to you from the prior paragraph,
18 a reference which makes perfectly clear that the Committee
19 was talking about both foreign and domestic mail. The sentence
20 which says the following:

21 "Covert mail coverage, also known as sophisticated mail
22 coverage, or flaps and seals, entails surreptitious screening,
23 and may include opening and examination of domestic or foreign
24 mail."

25 Now, the sentence which says "covert coverage has been

1 discontinued", that is a lie. That is false as far as your
2 knowledge, Mr. Hoover's knowledge, Mr. Helms' knowledge, and
3 Mr. Sullivan's knowledge, isn't that correct?

4 Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, I'm trying to read your preceding
5 paragraph.

6 Senator Baker. While we're waiting, what page of what
7 document are we on?

8 Mr. Schwarz. It's page 29 of our Tab A-1.

9 Mr. Angleton. It is still my impression, Mr. Schwarz,
10 that this activity that is referred to as having been discontinued
11 refers to the Bureau's activities in this field.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Well the words don't say that, number one.

13 Number two, how would a reader of these words have any
14 idea that that distinction is being drawn, Mr. Angleton?

15 Mr. Angleton. Well it is certainly my impression that
16 this was the gap which the Bureau was seeking to cure.

17 In other words, that they had had such --

18 Mr. Schwarz. Let's make perfectly clear what we're
19 talking about.

20 You knew, Mr. Helms knew, Mr. Hoover knew and Mr. Sullivan
21 knew that the CIA was, in fact, opening the mail, and the
22 sentence says "covert coverage" which means mail opening "has
23 been discontinued".

24 Mr. Angleton. But I still say that the FBI, in my view,
25 are the ones who made the contribution of that statement. It

1 was covering the problems that they had had in discontinuing
2 their mail coverage.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Helms signed the report, didn't he?

4 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

5 Mr. Schwarz. All right.

6 I just want to have you read into the record from two more
7 documents which relate to the Attorney General of the United
8 States being informed about mail opening, but being informed
9 in June 1971, or in other words, a year after the Huston Plan.

10 Would you first read into the record from the brown book,
11 Tab J, paragraph four of that document. And while you are
12 looking for it, I will identify it for the record that that is
13 a CIA Memorandum, for the record, dated May 19, 1971, Subject,
14 DCI's meeting concerning HTLINGUAL, which was a code name for
15 the mail opening program. And it refers, Mr. Angleton, to a
16 meeting in Mr. Helms' office which involved a number of CIA
17 officials, including yourself.

18 Now, would you read into the record paragraph four please?

19 Senator Baker. What page?

20 Mr. Schwarz. It's the first page, Senator, of Tab J, in
21 the brown book.

22 Mr. Angleton. May I read it to myself first, please?

23 Paragraph four: "The DCI", meaning the Director of
24 Central Intelligence, "then asked who in the Post Office
25 Department knows the full extent of the operation beyond covert

surveillance. The Chief of Counterintelligence", meaning myself,
"replied that only Mr. Cotter knows, for he has been witting
while with the CIA and the Office of Security. The previous
Chief Postal Inspector, Mr. Montague, had never wanted to know
the extent of examination actually done, and thus, was able to
deny on oath before a Congressional Committee that there was
any tampering. Mr. Cotter would be unable to make such a
denial under oath.

"In an exchange between the Director for Central Intelligence
and the Deputy Director for Plans, it was observed that while
Mr. Cotter's loyalty to CIA could be assumed, his dilemma is
that he owes loyalty now to the Postmaster General."

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Now because of that dilemma, in other words, for the
first time, someone was in the Post Office Department that, for
sure, knew that the mail was being opened. Because of that
dilemma, Mr. Helms went to see the Attorney General, did he not?

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Now, would you read into the record from the Memorandum
for the record, 3 June 1971, which, Senators, is at Tab K,
Subject, Meeting at the DCI's Office Concerning HTLINGUAL,
dated, as I said, June 3rd, 1971.

Would you read into the record, the second paragraph which
refers to Mr. Helms' statement that he had briefed the Attorney

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1 General concerning the mail opening program.

2 Mr. Angleton. Paragraph two. "Mr. Helms stated that on
3 Monday he had briefed Attorney General Mitchell on the operation.
4 (Note: Mr. Helms may have meant Tuesday, 1 June, Monday having
5 been a holiday.) Mr. Helms indicated that Mr. Mitchell fully
6 concurred in the value of the operation and had no 'hang-ups'
7 concerning it. When discussing the advisability of also
8 briefing Postmaster General Blount, Mr. Mitchell encouraged
9 Mr. Helms to undertake such a briefing."

10 Mr. Schwarz. All right.

11 Now, that document was dated June 3rd, 1971, and the mail
12 opening program lasted until January or February 1973, when,
13 at the instance of Mr. Colby -- who said it was illegal -- it
14 was dropped. Is that correct?

15 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

16 It was actually -- the Director was Mr. Schlesinger.

17 Mr. Schwarz. And was it not Mr. Colby who was the moving
18 force saying it was illegal?

19 Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

20 Mr. Schwarz. All right.

21 No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

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1 The Chairman. Mr. Angleton -- well, first of all, Mr.
2 Smothers, do you have any questions at this time?

3 Mr. Smothers. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

4 Mr. Angleton, there are two matters I would like to inquire
5 into briefly. First, the process regarding approval for such
6 actions as mail opening and secondly into the nature of this
7 working group itself.

8 The chief counsel has just raised the question regarding
9 the statement in the report of the interagency group, and you
10 indicated in response to his question that that may have been
11 put in by the FBI. Is that correct?

12 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

13 Mr. Smothers. The statement regarding the covert operation
14 and the fact that it had been discontinued. Can you hear me?

15 Mr. Angleton. Yes. I am sorry, I did not get the last
16 part of your question.

17 Mr. Smothers. With respect to the discontinuance of the
18 covert operation, mail opening, as mentioned in that report, you
19 theorized, in response to Mr. Schwartz's question that that may
20 have been a statement put in by the FBI. To the best of your
21 knowledge, did not the FBI do most of the drafting on this
22 report?

23 Mr. Angleton. The FBI, as I recall it, collected the
24 opinions after each meeting of the participating agencies and
25 appeared at the next meeting with minutes and a draft of the

1 previous session.

2 Mr. Smothers. All right. With respect to the question then
3 of mail opening, is it your experience that this kind of
4 operation by the Central Intelligence Agency would have been
5 discussed in interagency working group meetings among persons who
6 would otherwise have been uninformed of such operations?

7 Mr. Angleton. I apologize, but again I am not hearing you
8 very well.

9 Mr. Smothers. With respect to --

10 Mr. Angleton. There's a resonance here.

11 Mr. Smothers. With respect to operations such as mail
12 opening, is it your opinion that the Central Intelligence Agency
13 would have discussed such projects in working group meetings
14 involving persons from other agencies, persons not otherwise
15 privy to such operations?

16 Mr. Angleton. No, we would not raise such an operation.

17 Mr. Smothers. In the normal course of things, would there
18 have been an approval channel other than such interagency groups
19 for securing presidential advice and consent to such operations?

20 Mr. Angleton. I am not aware of any other channel.

21 Mr. Smothers. Would such channels as the Special Group or the
22 Intelligence Board have been a proper place for such matters to
23 be raised?

24 Mr. Angleton. I do not believe that an operation of this
25 sensitivity would have been raised in any body. It would have

1 been -- if there was going to be submission for presidential
2 approval, it would have been raised either by the Director of the
3 FBI or the Director of Central Intelligence.

4 Mr. Smothers. But in any event, it would not have been
5 raised with this working group involved with the Huston Plan?

6 Mr. Angleton. That is correct. That is correct.

7 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Angleton, if we could turn for a moment
8 to the process resulting in the Plan itself, I would like to
9 take you back to your testimony before the staff of this
10 Committee on the 12th of September. At that time, you were
11 asked about the involvement of Mr. Tom Charles Huston in the
12 development of this plan. I would like to read to you from page
13 16 of your transcript and ask you if it accurately reflects
14 your comments at that time.

15 Mr. Johnson is doing the questioning, and his question to
16 you is; "Do you think that Tom Charles Huston viewed himself as
17 a potential arbitor for domestic intelligence disagreements
18 within the community?"

19 Your response: "I think he did because his short letter of
20 instructions to the heads of the intelligence community said that
21 his role was to be what Dr. Kissinger's was in foreign policy.
22 It was a very clear-cut edict, so to speak, that he was the
23 ultimate authority in the Executive for domestic security."

24 Mr. Angleton, is that statement still true?

25 Mr. Angleton. I'm sorry, sir, I don't have the text of that

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1 statement.

2 Mr. Smothers. We are beginning on page 16 of the transcript
3 of 12 September.

4 Mr. Angleton. May I have your question again, please?

5 Mr. Smothers. Have you looked at your comments beginning
6 at the bottom of page 16 and extending over the top of page 17?

7 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I have.

8 Mr. Smothers. Does that accurately reflect your testimony
9 on 12 September?

10 Mr. Angleton. I think it does. I could expand on it, but
11 I think that is quite accurate.

12 Mr. Smothers. But that response then is still true? You
13 still believe it to be true?

14 Mr. Angleton. I believe it very much so and that
15 particularly after listening to Mr. Huston yesterday.

16 Mr. Smothers. Let me then raise with you another question
17 regarding Mr. Huston's role. If you would, counsel, turn to page
18 24 of the same transcript -- Mr. Angleton, the question is raised
19 as to whether Mr. Huston was in fact the White House authority,
20 but in addition as to whether he was competent to manage such a
21 group as the one that was involved in the preparation of the
22 Huston Plan.

23 If you would turn to the last Angleton statement on page 24,
24 let me read into the record your comment at that time and ask if
25 that still represents your view.

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1 "Talking about his experience in the intelligence area, he
2 was very knowledgeable. He had obviously gone into this matter
3 at some length prior to the meeting. He knew precisely what none
4 of us really knew, that is the depths of the White House concern.
5 In fact, the most dramatic moment, I think, was at the beginning
6 of one meeting. At some stage in the meetings, after preliminary
7 draft had been put forward, he found it totally unacceptable, and
8 his comments were to the effect that the subcommittee was not
9 being responsive to the President's needs."

10 Mr. Angleton. Yes?

11 Mr. Smothers. Does that accurately reflect your comments?

12 Mr. Angleton. It does indeed. I think it is almost a
13 direct quotation as it relates to his insistence, after one of
14 the sessions. He began the next session with the statement to the
15 effect that the committee was not responding -- the drafting
16 committee was not responding to the President's requests and was
17 not responsive to it.

18 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Angleton, as a final question, was there
19 any doubt in your mind during the period of these meetings that
20 your task was to respond to the White House's bidding, and that
21 the bidding, the message if you will, was being brought by Tom
22 Charles Huston?

23 Mr. Angleton. I am sorry, the last part, I --

24 Mr. Smothers. During the course of the meetings of this
25 interagency intelligence group, was there any doubt in your mind

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1 that your purpose was to respond to the White House bidding and
2 that the Message regarding the desires of the White House was
3 being brought by Tom Charles Huston?

4 Mr. Angleton. There was no question in my mind, nor in the
5 minds of others that he represented the Commander-in-Chief in
6 terms of bringing together this plan, and he certainly never
7 qualified what his authority was. He made it very clear, and he
8 submitted in writing that he was to have this role for domestic
9 intelligence comparable to Dr. Kissinger's role in foreign
10 affairs.

11 Mr. Smothers. Thank you, Mr. Angleton.

12 Mr. Chairman, I have nothing further.

13 The Chairman. Mr. Angleton, you heard Mr. Huston's
14 testimony yesterday?

15 Mr. Angleton. I heard most of it, sir.

16 The Chairman. You will remember then that he represented
17 to the Committee that in response to the President's desire to
18 extend intelligence coverage within this country that he asked
19 the various departments of the government involved, the FBI, the
20 CIA, the NSA, to come together with a plan and give the President
21 some options, and that the purpose of the recommendations that
22 were made to the President in the so-called Huston Plan, based
23 upon the recommendations that had come from these departments,
24 was to secure the President's authorization to eliminate
25 restrictions that he felt were obstructing this gathering of

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1 intelligence.

2 Now, Mr. Huston told us that he was never informed by the
3 CIA, the FBI, or any agency that the mail was being opened. He
4 made a recommendation to the President. The President authorized
5 mail openings, and he testified that to his knowledge the
6 President did not know that the mail was being opened either.

7 Now, when we asked Mr. Helms, the Director of the CIA, if
8 to his knowledge the President had been told of the mail openings,
9 he said, I do not know whether he knew it or not.

10 So the state of the record is that to the best of our
11 knowledge the President had not been told that the mail was being
12 opened. He gets a recommendation in which it is represented
13 that covert coverage, which is mail openings, has been
14 discontinued, and he is asked to authorize the reopening of this
15 program.

16 Now, you have referred to the President as the Commander-
17 in-Chief. What possible justification was there to
18 misrepresent a matter of such importance to the Commander-in-
19 Chief?

20 Mr. Angleton. I would say that your question is very well
21 put, Mr. Chairman. I can only speculate -- and I do not have
22 any record of the discussions between ourselves and the FBI
23 during the drafting stages, but I know we had several where
24 matters tabled within the drafting committee, were matters that
25 we never explained to the other members, and one of them, of

1 course, was the mail intercept.

2 Again, only by way of speculation, I believe if the
3 President had approved, or even if there had been some access to
4 the President -- because I think this is probably the most
5 difficult task of all, was to have the audience in which these
6 things could be explained -- I have no satisfactory answer to
7 your question, except that I do believe that a great deal of the
8 mail problem centered on the Bureau's lack of coverage, not the
9 Agency's.

10 The Chairman. But the CIA was the agency principally
11 involved in the mail openings.

12 Mr. Angleton. That is correct for all foreign mail, not
13 for domestic.

14 The Chairman. Yes, and we will explore the whole breadth of
15 that program in due course. Did not the CIA have an affirmative
16 duty to inform the President about such a program?

17 Mr. Angleton. I believe so, without any question.

18 The Chairman. But it apparently was not done. You did not
19 inform the President. Director Helms did not inform the
20 President, so --

21 Mr. Angleton. I would say, sir, not by way of any excuse,
22 but those were very turbulent periods for the intelligence
23 community and particularly for the FBI, and I think that all of
24 us had enormous respect for Mr. Hoover and understood the
25 problems which he had in sustaining the reputation of the FBI.

1 The Chairman. But the fact that the times were turbulent,
2 the fact that illegal operations were being conducted by the
3 very agencies we entrust to uphold and enforce the law makes it
4 all the more incumbent that the President be informed of what is
5 going on, does it not? It is really not an excuse.

6 Mr. Angleton. I do not think there was ever the forum in
7 which these matters could be raised at that level. I think that
8 has been one of the troubles in domestic counterintelligence and
9 foreign counterintelligence that the issues never do get beyond
10 the parochial circle of those engaged in that activity.

11 The Chairman. But you have said that there was an
12 affirmative duty on the CIA to inform the President?

13 Mr. Angleton. I don't dispute that.

14 The Chairman. And he was not informed, so that was a
15 failure of duty to the Commander-in-Chief, is that correct?

16 Mr. Angleton. Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone would
17 have hesitated to inform the President if he had at any moment
18 asked for a review of intelligence operations.

19 The Chairman. That is what he did do. That is the very
20 thing he asked Huston to do. That is the very reason that these
21 agencies got together to make recommendations to him, and when
22 they made their recommendations, they misrepresented the facts.

23 Mr. Angleton. I was referring, sir, to --

24 The Chairman. But I am referring to --

25 Mr. Angleton. -- a much more restricted forum.

1 The Chairman. I am referring to the mail, and what I have
2 said is solidly based upon the evidence. The President wanted
3 to be informed. He wanted recommendations. He wanted to decide
4 what should be done, and he was misinformed.

5 Not only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered
6 authorizing the opening of the mail five days later and revoked
7 it, the CIA did not pay the slightest bit of attention to him,
8 did it, The Commander-in-Chief, as you say?

9 Mr. Angleton. I have no satisfactory answer for that.

10 The Chairman. You have no satisfactory answer?

11 Mr. Angleton. No, I do not.

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1 The Chairman. I do not think there is a satisfactory
2 answer because having revoked the authority the CIA went ahead
3 with the program. So that the Commander-in-Chief is not the
4 Commander-in-Chief at all. He is just a problem. You do not
5 want to inform him in the first place because he might say no.
6 That is the truth of it. And when he did say no you disregard
7 it and then you call him the Commander-in-Chief.

8 I have no further questions.

9 Senator Tower?

10 Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, the role of certain leaders
11 within the intelligence community, such as Mr. Helms, have been
12 of concern to this committee. Now referring back to your
13 transcript of September 12, at page 17, you were asked about
14 the role of the Director of your agency, the role of Mr. Helms.
15 And you began by discussing the first meeting of the interagency
16 committee. Now you were asked who attended it and your response
17 was, and I read from the transcript.

18 Mr. Angleton. Pardon me, sir, I did not understand.

19 Senator Tower. You were asked who attended it and your
20 response was as follows, and I read directly from the
21 transcript, "Mr. Helms, but he attended only for a few moments.
22 Huston made the opening remarks as I recall. And since it was
23 being held in our building, Helms made a brief appearance so
24 to speak, the host, and he took off and I do not think from that
25 moment he attended any other meetings."

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1 Now, Mr. Angleton, the question is this. Is this still an
2 accurate characterization of Mr. Helms' participation in the
3 decisions and recommendations leading up to a so-called Huston
4 Plan?

5 Mr. Angleton. I did not mean my statement to indicate
6 that there is any neglect of duty. It was simply that the
7 working group were qualified to adhere to certain guidelines.
8 Mr. Helms' appearance, first appearance, was to lend weight to
9 the President's request and to support Mr. Huston.

10 Senator Tower. Are you saying then that Mr. Helms made
11 no substantial contribution to the substance of the report?

12 Mr. Angleton. No, I am speaking about the -- that his
13 original talk was only to outline what the President required
14 from the working group and naturally I saw him from time to
15 time in terms of I would telephone him to indicate where we
16 stood on the report.

17 Senator Tower. Now Mr. Angleton, in these working group
18 session, who represented the FBI?

19 Mr. Angleton. Mr. Sullivan, sir, who was also the Chair-
20 man of the working group.

21 Senator Tower. In your opinion, did Mr. Sullivan views
22 accurately represent those of Mr. Hoover?

23 Mr. Angleton. No, I do not think so.

24 Senator Tower. Could you elaborate on that?

25 Mr. Angleton. Mr. Sullivan, as the chief of the internal

1 security, assistant director for internal security, found him-
2 self handicapped by lack of personnel and funding and in addition
3 many of the aggressive operations conducted by the Bureau in the
4 past have been systematically cut out by Mr. Hoover.

5 Senator Tower. What does that mean? What significance is
6 that?

7 Mr. Angleton. The significance being that the production
8 of internal security fell down considerably.

9 Senator Tower. Now, Mr. Angleton, did you come to gain
10 some insight into the relationship between Mr. Sullivan and
11 Mr. Tom Charles Huston?

12 Mr. Angleton. Well, it was my understanding, sir, that
13 they had known one another for over a year prior to the
14 meetings. And I would suggest that Mr. Huston was much better
15 educated when he embarked on these matters than his testimony
16 suggests. I find him extremely knowledgable. He was certainly
17 aware of the gaps.

18 Senator Tower. Would you say that Mr. Huston reflected
19 the views of Mr. Sullivan?

20 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

21 Senator Tower. Would you say Mr. Huston reflected the
22 views of Mr. Sullivan?

23 Mr. Angleton. Very much so, sir.

24 Senator Tower (presiding). I have no further questions.

25 Mr. Mondale?

1 Senator Mondale. Thank you, Senator Tower.

2 Mr. Angleton, you were in charge of the covert mail cover
3 program from the beginning, am I correct?

4 Mr. Angleton. Not from the beginning, sir, from 1955.

5 Senator Mondale. All right.

6 Mr. Angleton. I took it on as an ongoing operation which
7 had been lodged also in the agency.

8 Senator Mondale. And what is your understanding as to
9 who authorized the program?

10 Mr. Angleton. I would say that the operation that was
11 first initiated in 1952, at some stage the authorization was
12 from the chief of operations of the clandestine services.

13 Senator Mondale. As you conducted this program, under
14 whose authority was it your understanding that you were opera-
15 ting under?

16 Mr. Angleton. Within the agency?

17 Senator Mondale. Yes.

18 Mr. Angleton. Under the chief of the clandestine opera-
19 tions.

20 Senator Mondale. The deputy director for plans, would
21 that be?

22 Mr. Angleton. Correct.

23 Senator Mondale. And for your purposes, was that considered
24 adequate authority or was this such that you felt authority had
25 to flow from either the President or the National Security

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1 Council?

2 Mr. Angleton. I believe that I regarded that, plus the
3 authority from the director who was knowledgeable of the program,
4 as internal authority.

5 Senator Mondale. And at your level of operations, that
6 would be the only authority you would concern yourself with?

7 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

8 Senator Mondale. All right. What was your understanding
9 of the legality of the covert mail operation?

10 Mr. Angleton. That it was illegal.

11 Senator Mondale. What?

12 Mr. Angleton. That it was illegal.

13 Senator Mondale. It was illegal.

14 Now you are an Attorney?

15 Mr. Angleton. No, I am not, sir.

16 Senator Mondale. Well, that might be an asset.

17 Mr. Angleton. That is my cover.

18 Senator Mondale. Being one myself I should not say that.

19 Mr. Angleton. That is my cover, Senator.

20 Senator Mondale. How do you rationalize conducting a
21 program which you believe to be illegal?

22 Mr. Angleton. To begin with, I was taking it over as an
23 ongoing operation and there was probability that the program,
24 through lack of personnel and funding, would have been scrubbed
25 at some stage. From the counter intelligence point of view,

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1 we believe that it was extremely important to know everything
2 possible regarding contacts of American citizens with Communist
3 countries.

4 And second, that we believed that the security of the
5 operation was such that the Soviets were unaware of such a
6 program and therefore that many of the interests that the Soviets
7 would have in the United States, subversive and otherwise, would
8 be through the open mails, when their own adjudication was that
9 the mails could not be violated.

10 Senator Mondale. So that a judgment was made with which
11 you concurred, that although covert mail openings were illegal,
12 the good that flowed from it in terms of anticipating threats
13 to this country through the use of this counter intelligence
14 technique made it worthwhile nevertheless.

15 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

16 Excuse me, sir.

17 Senator Mondale. Did you have something more to say?

18 Mr. Angleton. No, I am sorry.

19 Senator Mondale. How do you recommend that this committee
20 deal with this profound crisis between political and legal
21 responsibility in government, a nation that believes in the
22 laws and what you regard to be the counter intelligence impera-
23 tive of illegal activity? What do we do about it?

24 Mr. Angleton. My own belief has always been that high
25 authority, whether it be on the Hill, the Congress, or in the

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1 Executive, needs to examine very closely the counter intelligence
2 content available to this government regarding its adversaries,
3 and regarding the Soviet and the Soviet Bloc.

4 To my knowledge, there has never been such an examination.
5 I believe very much in a statement made by Director of the FBI,
6 Mr. Kelley, that it is his firm view, which he expressed in
7 Canada at a Bar Association convention, that certain individual
8 rights have to be sacrificed for the national security.

9 Senator Mondale. Do you believe that national security
10 cannot be protected except through the sacrifice of these
11 rights?

12 Mr. Angleton. I believe that all matters dealing with
13 counter espionage require very sophisticated handling and
14 require considerable latitude.

15 Senator Mondale. And who do you think should be empowered
16 to determine which rights should be set aside?

17 Mr. Angleton. I think that, sir, not being an expert in
18 these matters, that it should be a combination of the Executive
19 and the Congress.

20 Senator Mondale. And how would the Congress express
21 itself? Traditionally, it is through the adoption of laws.

22 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

23 Senator Mondale. How would Congress make its views
24 known? Through the adoption of laws?

25 Mr. Angleton. I am afraid I do not --

1 Senator Mondale. Well, as I understand the progression
2 of this discussion, it is your opinion that this nation cannot
3 protect itself without setting aside certain personal liberties.
4 And then I asked you, well who would determine what liberties
5 were to be set aside. And you have said it should be a combi-
6 nation of the Executive and the Congress. Of course, the Con-
7 gress acts through laws. Are you saying that we should take
8 another look at our laws to see whether they fully meet the
9 needs of national security?

10 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

11 Senator Mondale. Well, would it not have been better
12 then, when these laws were violated in the past, to do just
13 that? Come to the Congress and say, "in our opinion we cannot
14 defend you under this present of laws and therefore we make
15 these recommendations for change." That was not what was done.
16 Surreptitiously and privately and covertly legal rights of the
17 American people were violated; in this case, opening of mail,
18 without any such approval in the law. Is that correct?

19 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

20 Senator Mondale. Do you think that was a correct way to
21 proceed?

22 Mr. Angleton. I think in an ideal world dealing with
23 intelligence, and I have never seen one yet, that these matters
24 should have been brought up vigorously. All through the life
25 span of the Central Intelligence Agency, I do not think there

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1 was the proper form here for the airing securely of these
2 matters.

3 Senator Mondale. I disagree with you on the question of
4 national security. I think our Constitution provides plenty of
5 power to protect this country. But in any event, I see no
6 authority in anyone in the Executive or in the Congress or any-
7 where else for determining, on their own, that the law is not
8 good enough and therefore taking it into their own hands. I
9 see no way of conducting a civilized, democratic society with
10 those kinds of rules.

11 Now in your system for covert openings, there was prepared
12 a watch list which set forth certain names of organizations and
13 purposes and those names were the trigger for opening mail to
14 or from them which were sent internationally. On the watch list.

15 Mr. Angleton. To the Soviet Union.

16 Senator Mondale. To the Soviet Union. On the list
17 included Linus Pauling, John Steinbeck, the author, and Victor
18 Reuther of the Auto Workers. What counter intelligence objec-
19 tive was it thought you were achieving in opening the mail of
20 what most of us would assume to be very patriotic, thoughtful,
21 decent Americans?

22 Mr. Angleton. Sir, I would prefer, if possible, to
23 respond to that question in Executive session.

24 Senator Mondale. Well, I would like the answer. The
25 Chairman is not here so I think we ought to pass that request

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1 up until the Chairman is back.

2 I have several other questions along that line with other
3 names. But, in any event, let us wait until the Chairman
4 returns.

5 Senator Tower. What was the request of the witness? That
6 it not be answered except in executive session?

7 Senator Mondale. Yes, I asked about three names that were
8 on the watch list and he asked to answer that in executive
9 session.

10 I think we should await the Chairman.

11 Mr. Angleton. Sir, may I please modify that?

12 Mr. Brown. Would the Senator please just indulge us for
13 just a moment so I can confer with Mr. Angleton?

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1 Senator Tower. Let us have order, please.

2 Mr. Angleton, should you answer this question in open
3 session, would you be disclosing classified information that has
4 not been previously cleared for disclosure?

5 Mr. Angleton. Yes, but they would also require that I have
6 the opportunity to review files in the agency.

7 Senator Tower. I am sorry. I did not hear your response.

8 Mr. Angleton. It would also -- I would also need to have
9 the opportunity to review files in the agency before making any
10 response.

11 Senator Tower. In other words, you do not know whether it
12 would be disclosing classified information that has not been
13 cleared?

14 Mr. Angleton. I would not depend on my memory, sir, at this
15 time, because these are cases or matters which apparently were
16 some time back.

17 Senator Tower. The Chair will rule that for the time being,
18 you will not be required to answer the question in open session;
19 but that the matter can be re-opened, should the Committee decide
20 that they should be disclosed in public session.

21 Mr. Angleton. Thank you.

22 Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I have got
23 some other names I would like to submit to Mr. Angleton which I
24 wish he would use in his review in preparation for that answer,
25 whether in public or in private.

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1 Senator Tower. Thank you, Senator Mondale. Senator Baker?
2 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
3 I believe most of the information relevant to the Huston
4 plan document have been covered by other members of the
5 Committee and by counsel. But there are two or three things of
6 a more general nature that I would like to direct Mr. Angleton's
7 attention to, and ask his reaction or comments on.

8 Before I do, however, your job at the time of your retirement
9 from the CIA was what?

10 Mr. Angleton. I was the head of counterintelligence.

11 Senator Baker. Counterintelligence, in layman's terms,
12 implies something other than intelligence. I take it that it
13 implies something to do with keeping up with what the other
14 fellow's intelligence would be.

15 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

16 Senator Baker. Was a major part of your operation concerned
17 with intelligence operations against the United States by, say,
18 the Soviet Union or other countries?

19 Mr. Angleton. It was a question of all hostile intelligence
20 services where we have a situation, for example, that in the
21 Soviet bloc alone, there are over 27 intelligence services who
22 would conduct activity in the United States and in the territories
23 of allies.

24 Senator Baker. Well, to put it in lay terms again,
25 counterintelligence was to protect our intelligence resources?

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1 Mr. Angleton. It was to penetrate and frustrate the
2 espionage and subversion from outside.

3 Senator Baker. How, then, was counterintelligence --

4 Senator Tower. Excuse me, Senator Baker. Would you yield
5 for a moment? The reporters are having difficulty hearing you.
6 Could you tilt your mike up, sir, and speak more directly into
7 it?

8 Senator Baker. How, then, was counterintelligence, your
9 area of concern and expertise -- how was that involved, or how
10 was it important to that area to be involved with mail openings?

11 Mr. Angleton. Well, since the mail openings were to the
12 Communist countries, it meant that there was a contact, regular
13 contact, with Americans and third nationals who were here. For
14 example, there are many third nationals that were here studying
15 who, in turn, had relatives who were studying in Soviet
16 institutions.

17 Senator Baker. I can follow that. But what prompted the
18 question was, why on earth would you have, for instance, Frank
19 Church or Richard Nixon on that list?

20 Mr. Angleton. I would say it was an error.

21 Senator Baker. Pardon?

22 Mr. Angleton. I would say it was very much an error.

23 Senator Baker. It was an error to have them on the list?

24 Mr. Angleton. That is precisely correct.

25 Senator Baker. Are there other members of this Committee

1 that were on that list?

2 Mr. Angleton. I'm not aware of it, sir. I've not gone
3 through the listings.

4 Senator Baker. You began this operation in 1954 or
5 thereabouts, I understand.

6 Mr. Angleton. It was started in another part of the agency
7 in 1952, and it was taken over by us -- counterintelligence -- in
8 1955.

9 Senator Baker. And I understand from your testimony to
10 Senator Mondale that you think that it is of sufficient value so
11 that it ought to be continued.

12 Mr. Angleton. It is certainly my opinion, and the opinion
13 of my former associates.

14 Senator Baker. Even if it required the change of the statute
15 law -- and I am not sure that would even do it. But let us just
16 assume for the moment that you had to have a Congressional debate
17 on the necessity for doing it, and thus change the nature of the
18 postal system; i.e., people no longer would assume that their
19 mail was inviolate, that people probably were going to inspect it.
20 That gets us terribly close to Big Brotherism; the idea that
21 when you mail a letter, you have got to assume that somebody may
22 read it, at least a letter outside the country.

23 Even if you assume that that would be the range and scale of
24 the debate in the Congress, you would favor the passage of such
25 a bill?

1 Mr. Angleton. I didn't quite say that, sir.

2 Senator Baker. Pardon?

3 Mr. Angleton. I didn't think I quite said that.

4 Senator Baker. Well, I am trying to figure out --

5 Mr. Angleton. I believe I would prefer, if possible, to
6 stick to what I believe to be the approach to the problems within
7 the intelligence community; and that is that both the Executive,
8 at a high level, and the Congress examine in depth the nature of
9 the threat to our national security.

10 Senator Baker. If I may interrupt you for a minute, I think
11 I ought to explain why I am proceeding in this way. I know, from
12 reading your briefing papers, and from a general impression of
13 your service to your country and to the CIA, that you have been
14 an extraordinarily important figure in the intelligence and
15 counterintelligence scheme of things for many, many years. I
16 believe, based on your testimony, that you have a grave concern
17 for the nature and the scope of the foreign threat, and the
18 importance of the methods and techniques that are employed or may
19 be employed by the CIA, by the DIA, and by other intelligence
20 agencies.

21 That is my general impression. But your impression of us
22 should be that, while we recognize the importance of that, it
23 gets right sticky when it would appear that, in some cases
24 clearly that, those methods and techniques violate either the
25 statute law or the Constitution of the United States. And what

1 I am putting to you is whether or not this country, then, should
2 engage in a debate in the Congressional forum, which is where
3 laws are made and changed; should engage in a debate about a
4 matter such as the changing of the fundamental nature of the
5 postal system -- that is to say, to create a situation where
6 people must assume that their mail is being read.

7 Now, are the methods, are the techniques for intelligence
8 gathering -- is the nature of the foreign threat such that we
9 should go ahead with that debate, or even pass such a statute?

10 Mr. Angleton. I think in the present atmosphere, it would
11 be impossible.

12 Senator Baker. I am not asking -- that is sort of our job,
13 too; to guess what is possible and impossible in the Congress,
14 and I am often fooled about what is possible and impossible. But
15 from your standpoint, what I am trying to drive at is whether or
16 not you believe the scope and the extent of the threat to this
17 country from abroad is sufficient to launch this Congress into a
18 debate on whether there should be such a change in the postal
19 laws or not.

20 Mr. Angleton. Well, I must accept, sir, the fact that again,
21 that I do not believe that the atmosphere would even tolerate
22 this subject being the subject of debate. I think these
23 perceptions of dangers and threats have changed very greatly in
24 the last two years. I think the policies of detente and, prior
25 to that, peaceful coexistence --

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1 Senator Baker. What do you think of the policies of detente?

2 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

3 Senator Baker. What do you think of the policies of detente?

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, I would only speak to the question of
5 detente, peaceful coexistence, strictly from counterintelligence
6 observation.

7 Senator Baker. That is why I asked you. You were the head
8 man in that field. What do you think of it?

9 Mr. Angleton. My view is that there is complete illusion to
10 believe that, on the operative, clandestine side -- which is, in
11 a sense, a secret war that has continued since World War II --
12 that the Soviets or the Soviet bloc have changed their objectives.
13 And I base this on counterintelligence cases.

14 Senator Baker. I do not mean to embarrass you, Mr. Angleton,
15 but I want to ask you this question. In that respect, is your
16 disagreement with detente as a national policy part of the
17 reason why you retired from the CIA at the time you did?

18 Mr. Angleton. I really cannot say. Every day that passes,
19 I discover, much to my amazement, certain points of view and
20 activity in which I might say, neither myself nor my colleagues
21 were in great favor. I cannot be specific. I do not have the
22 facts.

23 Senator Baker. Mr. Angleton, there are many questions I
24 could ask. Your experience covers a turbulent time in history,
25 and the temptation to ask you specific details about it is almost

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1 irresistible. But for the moment, in view of the time restraints,
2 I will postpone that.

3 I would ask only a single thing, and that is whether or not
4 you think there should be a significant national debate in a Congressional
5 forum, as well, on the question whether or not we should legalize some of the
6 activities that now appear to be illegal in the intelligence-
7 collecting field. Now, it is my own personal view that if you
8 are going to do some of these things, the country will not accept
9 them, and should not. They are intrinsically an intrusion,
10 beyond the scope of the permissible.

11 But if you are going to do some of the others, that are more
12 close-hauled, you ought not to do them without asking. You
13 ought to send them up to Congress and find out what the likelihood
14 of the law being changed may be. Would you generally agree, in
15 retrospect, that that ought to be the way this matter is
16 approached?

17 Mr. Angleton. There is no question in my mind.

18 Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston?

20 Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 Mr. Angleton, first I wonder if we might bring some of the
22 intelligence terminology down to lay language, so that the people
23 will have a complete understanding of what we are talking about
24 here. I think we have pretty well covered mail coverage, but
25 just to clarify it maybe somewhat further, this is the actual

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1 opening of mail of certain citizens who appear on a predetermined
2 list? Does some individual actually read this mail, or is it
3 photographed, or just how is this handled?

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, sir, the process was to collect mail
5 at an international terminal before it went abroad, and mail
6 coming from abroad from Communist countries, and having the
7 opportunity to surreptitiously open the envelopes, photograph
8 the contents, and to dispatch the mail to the addressee. The
9 photographs of the mail were brought through another part of our
10 organization to us in the counterintelligence, where we had a
11 group of some six people very fluent in languages, and also in
12 holograph, flaps, and they were very sophisticated technicians and
13 analysts. They would make abstracts of the mail where it was
14 important, together with internal findings and dossiers, and
15 direct it to certain selected customers.

16 Senator Huddleston. Customers being specific agencies of
17 the government, either CIA --

18 Mr. Angleton. For all intents and purposes it was only to
19 the FBI, although there was some mail that did -- there were some
20 special items that went to military intelligence.

21 Senator Huddleston. Now, electronic surveillance -- what
22 all does this involve?

23 Mr. Angleton. Pardon, sir?

24 Senator Huddleston. Electronic surveillance -- what does
25 this involve specifically?

1 Mr. Angleton. We were not involved in electronic surveillance.

2 Senator Huddleston. You know what it is, do you not?

3 Mr. Angleton. Yes, sir. It is all forms of eavesdropping.

4 Senator Huddleston. Is this tapping telephones?

5 Mr. Angleton. Telephones.

6 Senator Huddleston. That is, a wiretap.

7 Mr. Angleton. Bugs.

8 Senator Huddleston. Bugs in rooms, or in places where
9 people might assemble?

10 Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

11 Senator Huddleston. Without their knowledge?

12 Mr. Angleton. Hopefully.

13 Senator Huddleston. Surreptitious entry -- what is this
14 describing?

15 Mr. Angleton. That is the ability to penetrate into either
16 a building or mail --

17 Senator Huddleston. Break it down into a simple context
18 that we hear in every police court in the country on Monday
19 morning. It is breaking and entering to a great degree, is it
20 not? It might be --

21 Mr. Angleton. As long as there is no -- I say I agree, sir.

22 Senator Huddleston. I am sorry. I did not hear.

23 Mr. Angleton. I agree with you.

24 Senator Huddleston. It would be breaking into someone's
25 home or into his office or his apartment, and taking or

1 burglarizing -- in effect, taking what you consider to be important
2 to the objective.

3 Mr. Angleton. It is not so much taking as it is
4 photographing.

5 Senator Huddleston. Or photographing.

6 Mr. Angleton. There is not really much breakage.

7 Senator Huddleston. What do you mean by development of
8 campus sources?

9 Mr. Angleton. Is that in the context, sir, of the Huston?

10 Senator Huddleston. Yes, that was part of the Huston
11 objective.

12 Mr. Angleton. It simply meant the eventual recruitment of
13 sources on the campus.

14 Senator Huddleston. Would that be students?

15 Mr. Angleton. I believe it referred specifically to students
16 and perhaps some instructors.

17 Senator Huddleston. Who would perform as informants or as --

18 Mr. Angleton. They would be spotters in terms of possible
19 recruitment of people, or informants.

20 Senator Huddleston. I think it is important that the
21 people understand what we are talking about when we talk in
22 intelligence terms, Mr. Angleton, and those descriptions I think
23 will be helpful.

24 Now, prior to the development of the Huston plan, would you
25 say that one of the reasons that this development occurred was

1 that conflicts had grown between specifically the CIA and the FBI?

2 Mr. Angleton. Unfortunately, yes.

3 Senator Huddleston. Would you describe what some of those
4 conflicts were, some of the things that were troubling Mr. Hoover?

5 Mr. Angleton. Well, to begin with, in all fairness to Mr.
6 Hoover, after World War II, he was not happy with his activities
7 in certain parts of the world which he conducted during wartime,
8 being transferred to another agency. I do not believe that this
9 was jealousy, as has often been stated. I think that he only had
10 to look at the fact that during World War II, the SS had many
11 people who were loyal to General Donovan, but also had loyalties
12 to the opposition -- and I do not want to characterize it as
13 many. I think it is in many records. And therefore, there was
14 a very grave problem of the security standards of the agency
15 coming from World War II.

16 Senator Huddleston. Did this result in the concern that he
17 had that the FBI, that there were informants within the FBI that
18 were telling the CIA things that Mr. Hoover did not think they
19 should be telling?

Table 5-1

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1 Mr. Angleton. Sir, I think you are referring directly to
2 the one straw that broke the camel's back.

3 Senator Huddleston. Was this a single incident?

4 Mr. Angleton. A single incident in which an officer of
5 the Central Intelligence Agency received information to which he
6 was entitled regarding a foreign national who disappeared and he
7 received this information from an unnamed FBI officer. Mr.
8 Hoover demanded the identity of the FBI officer. The CIA
9 official as a matter of personal integrity refused to divulge
10 the name of his source and he also offered to the director,
11 Mr. Helms, his resignation.

12 Senator Huddleston. You indicate this was a one time inci-
13 dent. Are you suggesting that the CIA did not have other
14 sources of information from within the FBI that may not have
15 been known by the Director, Mr. Hoover?

16 Mr. Angleton. I would never call them sources. The CIA
17 had many contacts with the FBI at various levels.

18 Senator Huddleston. Were there also instances where the
19 CIA requested of the FBI and of Mr. Hoover that they undertake
20 certain wiretaps for domestic surveillance that Mr. Hoover
21 declined to do?

22 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

23 Senator Huddleston. Did this create friction also between
24 the agencies?

25 Mr. Angleton. Pardon, sir?

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1 Senator Huddleston. Did this also create friction between
2 the agencies?

3 Mr. Angleton. I do not think that that in itself neces-
4 sarily created the friction. I think the friction came from the
5 case I described earlier.

6 Senator Huddleston. Just that one case? Was that enough
7 to cause Mr. Hoover to eliminate the liaison totally and for-
8 mally between the two agencies.

9 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

10 Senator Huddleston. And he did that, in fact?

11 Mr. Angleton. He did indeed.

12 Senator Huddleston. During the early sessions of the
13 group that was setting up the Huston Plan, was this friction
14 evident to you as a participant of those meetings, that the CIA
15 and the FBI were not getting along at the top levels as they
16 might?

17 Mr. Angleton. Well, I do not think that the relationship
18 at the top levels was ever satisfactory. I believe -- and this
19 may be somewhat of an exaggeration -- but I believe that over a
20 period of some 25 years I do not think there were probably more
21 than three or four or five meetings between the Director of
22 FBI and the Director of CIA except those that might have been
23 casual, where they bumped into one another in a National
24 Security Conference.

25 Senator Huddleston. Did this adversely affect the

1 efficiency of our intelligence community?

2 Mr. Angleton. It did.

3 Senator Huddleston. Do you think Mr. Hoover's concern in
4 its dealings, the FBI's dealings, with the CIA was principally
5 because of the questionable legality of some of the things that
6 the CIA was asking him to do? Or was it a concern for the
7 public relations aspect of his agency?

8 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that Mr. Hoover was conscious
9 of all aspects of situations where the Bureau's interests were
10 affected, whether it be professional, whether it be public
11 relations, he was without question the number one law enforce-
12 ment officer in the United States and probably the most
13 respected individual outside the United States among all
14 foreign intelligence and security services. And I believe that
15 Mr. Hoover's real concern was that during the Johnson Admini-
16 stration, where the Congress was delving into matters pertaining
17 to FBI activities, Mr. Hoover looked to the President to give
18 him support in terms of conducting those operations. And when
19 that support was lacking, Mr. Hoover had no recourse but to
20 gradually eliminate activities which were unfavorable to the
21 Bureau and which in turn risked public confidence in the
22 number one law enforcement agency.

23 And I think his reasoning was impeccable.

24 Senator Huddleston. Well, did the CIA, on occasion, ask
25 Mr. Hoover and his agency to enter into black bag jobs?

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1 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

2 Senator Huddleston. And that is surreptitious entry or
3 in laymen's terms, breaking and entering.

4 Mr. Angleton. It deals basically with handling couriers,
5 the man who carries the bag.

6 Senator Huddleston. During the initial stages of the
7 committee developing the Huston Plan, did it occur to you to
8 inquire whether or not, since you were aware, that you were
9 suggesting or talking about doing things that were illegal--
10 did it occur to you to inquire whether or not the Attorney
11 General of the United States had been advised or questioned
12 about this plan?

13 Mr. Angleton. Well, I did not have, as a rule, relations
14 with many Attorney Generals except on very special cases.

15 Senator Huddleston. I am not suggesting you would have
16 inquired yourself, but that someone -- that his approval would
17 have been given or at least he would have been consulted with.

18 Mr. Angleton. My approach, sir, on that --

19 Senator Huddleston. Did it even bother you to wonder
20 about it?

21 Mr. Angleton. No. I think I can reconstruct my attitude
22 over many years on that matter, that I felt it most essential
23 that the Attorney General be aware of the program in order to
24 read the mail and to read the production. In other words, I
25 think that an Attorney General who does not know the

1 minutiae of the threat is a very poor Attorney General.

2 Senator Huddleston. Were you surprised then to learn that
3 he had not been consulted about the Huston Plan?

4 Mr. Angleton. I was absolutely shocked. I mean it was
5 unbelievable because one believed that he had everything
6 relating to Justice Department.

7 Senator Huddleston. Is that the reason that you testified
8 you were not surprised when, after he was consulted, after
9 Mr. Hoover went to him, that the President rescinded his
10 approval?

11 Mr. Angleton. I must repeat that I could well understand
12 how without even going into any inquiries, that the plan was
13 dead.

14 Senator Huddleston. You expected that to happen?

15 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.

16 Senator Huddleston. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

17 The Chairman (presiding). Thank you very much. I want
18 to thank Senator Tower for taking over and presiding for me.
19 I had to be at a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
20 mittee that is considering the Sinai agreements and for that
21 reason I had to absent myself. Thank you very much, Senator
22 Tower for presiding in my absence.

23 Let us see, we are now at Senator Schweiker, please.

24 Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Mr. Angleton, did you support in principal the Huston Plan?

1 At the time that this became a function of your decision making
2 process, administrative responsibility, did you support the
3 Huston Plan?-

4 Mr. Angleton. I did.

5 Senator Schweiker. After the Huston Plan was shot down,
6 I guess by a combination of John Mitchell and J. Edgar Hoover,
7 there were some other actions taken. First of all, John Dean
8 was moved in and somewhat replaced Mr. Huston in his duties and
9 then he wrote a memo on September 18 within two months of the
10 decision to abandon the Huston Plan. And he set up a new com-
11 mittee and I quote now from his memo, "a key to the entire
12 operation will be the creation of an interagency intelligence
13 unit for both operational and evaluation purposes." You were
14 a part of that new unit, was that not correct?

15 Mr. Angleton. I was present.

16 Senator Schweiker. And as I understand it, the very first
17 meeting of that unit was held in John Dean's office in the
18 White House. Is that correct?

19 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

20 Senator Schweiker. So in essence, by this move, did you
21 not really begin to accomplish many of the objectives that Mr.
22 Huston set out, but you did it in a way that Mr. Mitchell and
23 Mr. Hoover did not strenuously interpose their objection. Is
24 that correct?

25 Mr. Angleton. I do not have any evidence of that.

1 Senator Schweiker. Well, on April 12, do you recall there
2 was a meeting, Mr. Helms, Mr. Hoover, Admiral Gayler, to discuss
3 loosening up or broadening, whatever way you want to call it,
4 the information gathering techniques to the point where some of
5 the elements of the Huston Plan were being reconsidered. Do
6 you recall such a meeting?

7 Mr. Angleton. I know that that was something that was
8 of concern to the intelligence community prior to and after the
9 Huston Plan. The Huston Plan itself had no impact or did not
10 impact on the meeting, the question of espionage assist to
11 the National Security Agency.

12 Senator Schweiker. Well, some of the elements of the
13 Huston Plan, there were some seven or eight individual elements
14 of new ways of getting intelligence easier, were these not
15 similar to the proposals that were discussed at the meeting
16 there as well as the interagency meeting? Certainly you did
17 not discuss them and did they not come up for consideration
18 in different forms?

19 Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, sir.

20 Senator, I am trying to be responsive to your hypothesis.
21 The Huston Plan, in effect, as far as we were concerned, was
22 dead in five days and therefore all of the other matters of
23 enlarging procurement within the intelligence community were the
24 same concerns that existed prior to the Huston Plan, and subse-
25 quent to the Huston Plan. The Huston Plan had no impact

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1 whatsoever on the priorities within the intelligence community.

2 Senator Schweiker. I understand that, Mr. Angleton. But
3 at that meeting where Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler and the
4 others met, was there not a discussion to do some of the very
5 same things that had been referenced in the Huston Plan?

6 Mr. Angleton. That part is correct, sir.

7 Senator Schweiker. O.K., that is all I am trying to
8 establish.

9 Mr. Angleton. But it had a life of its own prior to the
10 Huston Plan.

11 Senator Schweiker. And then did not the Plumber's unit,
12 which was another offshoot, at a later time frame, do some of
13 the same elements, breaking and entering, that the Huston Plan
14 had proposed?

15 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

16 Senator Schweiker. I realize you are not directly con-
17 nected with the Plumbers, but did the Plumber's unit not do some
18 of the same things; breaking and entry, illegal burglary, that
19 the Huston Plan proposed? Is that not a fact?

20 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

21 Senator Schweiker. So in essence, they went around the
22 back door instead of the front door. Even though the Huston
23 Plan was dead I believe it had nine lives.

24 Now, Mr. Angleton, you were head of the Counter Intelligence
25 Unit of CIA and under you was a group called the Special

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1 Operations Group, Mr. Richard Ober, and we will be hearing from
2 him tomorrow. But inasmuch as you were involved as immediate
3 supervisor, is it correct to say that Operation CHAOS was under
4 your supervision, although not immediately?

5 Mr. Angleton. It was technically under my supervision for
6 ration and quarters.

7 Senator Schweiker. And you supported and went along with
8 Operation CHAOS as an executive of CIA, is that not correct?

9 Mr. Angleton. I was not familiar with all of the opera-
10 tions of CHAOS.

11 Senator Schweiker. What is that?

12 Mr. Angleton. I was not familiar with all of the opera-
13 tions of CHAOS .

14 Senator Schweiker. Did you object to it? Did you oppose
15 it? Did you fight it in any way?

16 Mr. Angleton. Those operations I knew about I approved,
17 I mean, I was approving of.

18 Senator Schweiker. O.K. Were you aware that some of the
19 Operation CHAOS agents were operating domestically in the
20 United States?

21 Mr. Angleton. I was not. I would qualify that to say, as
22 I have said before, before the Rockefeller Commission, that
23 there was a period in all operations of that nature where the
24 agent had to build cover in the United States. But I suggested,
25 and I still believe, that those operations should be examined

1 in terms of what was Mr. Ober's motive. And I think that one
2 will find, as far as I know, that his motive was to send these
3 people abroad for intelligence collection.

4 Senator Schweiker. Well, were you aware of the memo that
5 CIA sent to Walt Rostow and then Henry Kissinger which said the
6 following, and I quote, "you will, of course, be aware of the
7 peculiar sensitivity which attaches to the fact that CIA has
8 prepared a report on student activities, both here and abroad."
9 Were you aware of either memo, number one, or number two, that
10 you were following student activities here?

11 Mr. Angleton. Do we have this memorandum?

12 Senator Schweiker. I will ask the counsel whether you
13 have it. This was published in the Rockefeller Commission
14 Report. You might not have it immediately.

15 Mr. Angleton. I do not recall it.

16 Senator Schweiker. Let me ask you this way. Were you
17 aware of any activities under you or under people under your
18 direction that had to do with preparing a report on the domestic
19 activities of students here in the United States of America?

20 Mr. Angleton. There were reports that I cannot identify
21 unless I see them.

22 Senator Schweiker. That is not my question. My question
23 is were you aware of any counter intelligence activities
24 directed against the students of the United States of America
25 here at home, any? You were in charge of supervising this whole

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1 counter intelligence agency.

2 Mr. Angleton. I tried to explain, sir, that I was not
3 in charge.

4 Senator Schweiker. What is being chief of Counter Intelli-
5 gency mean?

6 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

7 Senator Schweiker. You were chief of the Counter Intelli-
8 gence Section, were you not?

9 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

10 Senator Schweiker. And that did not come under your
11 purview?

12 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

13 Senator Schweiker. That did not come under your admini-
14 stration?

15 Mr. Angleton. I said that Mr. Ober's unit was in the
16 Counter Intelligence staff for rations and quarters. I did not
17 have access to many of his disseminations. We were not even
18 on the carbon copies for dissemination. I did not know the
19 identity of his agents. I did not have any knowledge or appur-
20 tenances of a case officer over these activities.

21 Senator Schweiker. Let me ask you something that you did
22 testify to that we will not have problem of not communicating
23 on. On page 109 of your September 12 testimony, and I believe
24 you may have a copy there in front of you, in taking a deposi-
25 tion before this committee, you were specifically asked about

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1 shellfish toxins and shellfish poisons and how the CIA might
2 either ignore or not follow or contradict an order relating to
3 the destruction which we have held some hearings on last week.
4 Now you are quoted in your deposition here on page 109, about
5 the middle of the page, you say, "it is inconceivable that a
6 secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all
7 the overt orders of the government."

8 Is that an accurate quote or not accurate quote?

9 Mr. Angleton. Well, if it is accurate it should not have
10 been said.

11 The Chairman. That is right, Mr. Angleton.

12 Senator Schweiker. It looks like we are on plausible de-
13 nial again is all I can say here, Mr. Chairman. It is a direct
14 quote and I understand the procedure is to give you an oppor-
15 tunity to review your testimony each day in case you want to
16 correct it. Did you not have that opportunity?

17 Mr. Angleton. I did not expect, sir, to be called Friday
18 night late and told I would be here today. I intended in due
19 course to see my testimony. I was informed that I would be
20 present in October.

21 Senator Schweiker. Well, getting back to the issue at hand,
22 Mr. Angleton, do you believe that statement, that you made that,
23 or do you not believe it? What is the status report on your
24 belief of whether a secret intelligence agency has the right to
25 contradict a direct order of a President or whether it does not

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1 Mr. Angleton. Well, I would say I had been rather imprudent
2 in making those remarks.

3 Senator Schweiker. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, it raises
4 the problem that this Committee is really confronted with. And
5 I don't want to say that --

6 Unfortunately you are not the exception in this belief, Mr.
7 Angleton, because I think our work, our intelligence investiga-
8 tion, has turned up an awful lot of people in the intelligence
9 community who really feel this way.

10 I think that is exactly how the toxin situation got to where
11 it was. And, while this may not have been the biggest thing
12 that happened, I think it is indicative of the attitude of the
13 problem, it is indicative of what this Committee has to deal
14 with, and it is indicative of what the Congress has to deal
15 with. And you feel, or the community feels that even a direct
16 order of the President they are removed from. And I think it
17 does come to the heart of the issue.

18 I think you were honest in your statement and I think actu-
19 ally this is the issue before the Committee and the Congress
20 now.

21 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 The Chairman. Well I might observe that Mr. Angleton has
23 not denied the statement, nor has he changed his position. He
24 said it was an imprudent thing to say. That was your answer, was
25 it not?

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1 Mr. Angleton. I have not pursued the question of toxins
2 from a professional point of view. I did not listen to all of
3 the hearings on it. It is a matter very much outside of my
4 professional background.

5 The Chairman. But your statement, Mr. Angleton, is not
6 related to toxins. It is a very general statement, of which I
7 do believe represents your view.

8 Mr. Angleton. I am sorry, sir, but it does not necessarily
9 represent my views.

10 The Chairman. You said it is inconceivable that a secret
11 intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all of the
12 overt orders of the government.

13 Mr. Angleton. To comply with all overt --

14 The Chairman. Do you retract that statement now, or do you
15 merely regard it as imprudent.

16 Mr. Angleton. I have not studied the testimony, sir.

17 The Chairman. May I call your attention to it on page 109
18 of your testimony before this Committee, September the 12th,
19 beginning on line nine, and I read, "it is inconceivable that a
20 secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all
21 of the overt orders of the government."

22 Mr. Angleton. I withdraw that statement.

23 The Chairman. Do you withdraw that statement?

24 Mr. Angleton. I do.

25 The Chairman. Did you not mean it when you said it the

1 first time?

2 Mr. Angleton. This was before the hearings was it not, sir?

3 The Chairman. Pardon?

4 Mr. Angleton. This was stated before the hearings, before
5 you held your hearings on this matter?

6 The Chairman. Yes, but when you said it to us, did you mean
7 it or did you not mean it?

8 Mr. Angleton. I do not know how to respond to that question.

9 The Chairman. You do not know how to respond to the ques-
10 tion?

11 Mr. Angleton. I said that I withdrew the statement.

12 The Chairman. Very well, but you are unwilling to say whe-
13 ther or not you meant it when you said it.

14 Mr. Angleton. I would say that the entire speculation should
15 not have been indulged in.

16 two. I said that my speculation should not have been indulged
17 in.

18 The Chairman. I see.

19 Senator Morgan.

20 Senator Morgan. Mr. Angleton, I have only a question or

21 First of all, with regard to the question that the Chairman
22 asked you, do you know what specific order was being referred to
23 in that case?

24 Mr. Angleton. Pardon, sir?

25 Senator Morgan. Do you know, with regard to the question

that you gave, that the Chairman just read, do you know in what context that answer was given?

Mr. Brown. Excuse me, Senator, just a moment please.

Mr. Angleton. No, I did not know the orders.

Senator Morgan. I beg your pardon.

Mr. Angleton. No, sir, I did not know the orders.

Senator Morgan. Then you are not talking about any particular order, but you were talking about orders in general?

Mr. Angleton. Sir, I have not reviewed this transcript.

Senator Morgan. I understand that, Mr. Angleton. And that is why I was looking back at it myself.

If I could pursue for a moment the questions of Senator Mondale and Senator Baker, first of all, would you again draw the distinction between counter intelligence and intelligence gathering?

Mr. Angleton. In the ultimate, they are about the same thing. Counter intelligence is more or less all of the programs which the distillate is counter espionage. In other words, the sum total of counter intelligence activity includes dossiers, identification of individuals, travel control and a whole series of other dossier items. It forms the counter intelligence base. From that can be developed a product which is counter espionage, the dealing in confrontation with other intelligence services. Now, as a rule dealing with their aggressive aspects, whether it be subversion, whether it be espionage, and in certain instances

1 in the world of double agents, dealing with their counter espio-
2 nage.'

3 Senator Morgan. Now, as Chief of the Counter Intelligence
4 Section, how much of your work was involved in this country?

5 Mr. Angleton. Relatively little.

6 Senator Morgan. Was the mail cover part of it?

7 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

8 Senator Morgan. And before the Huston plan, you were inter-
9 cepting all mail going to Communist countries, photographing
10 it and intercepting all mail coming from Communist countries.

11 Mr. Angleton. That is correct. But there was a limit as
12 to the amount of mail which we opened and photographed.

13 Senator Morgan. What limitations were placed on the amount
14 of mail?

15 Mr. Angleton. It is where it was of no interest.

16 Senator Morgan. How did you determine whether or not mail
17 was of no interest if you --

18 Mr. Angleton. It was, as a matter of procedure, one of the
19 customer agencies would indicate that it, having levied a re-
20 quirement previously, would state that they no longer desired
21 such coverage.

22 Senator Morgan. Well, now, was it coverage of those who
23 were on the watch list or was it coverage of all mail going to
24 and from Communist countries?

25 Mr. Angleton. The basic thrust of the program was a watch

1 list.

2 Senator Morgan. Mr. Angleton, did you at that time, consid-
3 er the mail coverage indispensable to your job?

4 Mr. Angleton. I believed it was one of the few resources,
5 routine in nature, available to the counterintelligence.

6 Senator Morgan. Well, Senator Mondale asked you about the
7 rationale.

8 Mr. Angleton. Pardon, sir.

9 Senator Morgan. About your rationale behind opening the
10 mail. How do you reconcile it with the rights of the individuals
11 in this country, under our Constitution, how did you reconcile
12 your action?

13 Mr. Angleton. Well, Senator, I reconciled it in terms of
14 the knowledge I had and my colleagues had regarding the nature
15 of the threat.

16 Senator Morgan. Well, assuming, Mr. Angleton, that you
17 were justified in your actions, which I don't think you were,
18 but assuming that, what is to prevent some other individual from
19 deciding on his own that such activities are justified. And
20 what is to prevent him from carrying out such activities?

21 Mr. Angleton. Senator, I don't want to quibble. But I
22 will have to say that the operation was in being three years
23 before I entered the scene. It was not something of an individual
24 initiative, it was a group of like minded men who arrived at
25 similar and the same conclusions that this was an indispensable

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1 means of collecting foreign intelligence on the Soviets, who
2 regard this country to be the main enemy, and, together with
3 the Soviet Bloc, coordinates their activities on their ideological
4 basis. This is very persuasive to someone who has given up
5 31 years of their life with certain very high ideals for this
6 country.

7 When I left the Army, as many of us did, I believed that
8 we were in the dawn of a millenium. When I look at the map to-
9 day and the weakness of power of this country, that is what
10 shocks me.

11 Senator Morgan. Mr. Angleton, the thing that shocks me is
12 that these actions could be carried on contrary to the consti-
13 tutional rights of the citizens of this country.

14 Do you not believe that we can gather the necessary intel-
15 ligence that we need for the protection and security of this
16 country and at the same time live within the Constitution of
17 this country?

18 Mr. Angleton. I am not a constitutional lawyer and I do
19 not have at my fingertips those parts of the amendments which
20 appear, on the surface, to give the President certain rights,
21 say, in wiretapping, electronic -- I am not sure of this particu-
22 lar -- wiretapping and electronic surveillance.

23 And if I understand it correctly, I do not believe there
24 is too much of an extension to the next stage, which is the
25 question of American and Soviet communications, or Soviet Bloc

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1 communications.

2 Senator Morgan. I would beg to differ on that and on the
3 analysis that you made and also the one that Mr. Huston made.

4 But for the purpose of the guidance of this Committee, can
5 you give us any suggestion as to how the actions of the Central
6 Intelligence Agency can be monitored in such a way as to protect
7 the fundamental rights of the American citizens of this country?

8 Mr. Angleton. You mean how it should be restructured?

9 Senator Morgan. Yes, earlier you suggested that maybe the
10 Congress and the President should take some action. But the
11 thing that bothers me, Mr. Angleton, is how can we act, if we
12 don't know the facts? And, if we do act, the intelligence agen-
13 cies refuse to obey the guidelines and ordinances.

14 In other words, in the Huston plan, you were doing all of
15 these things before the Huston plan was devised. You continued
16 to do them after the President rejected the report. So, what
17 assurances do we have that an intelligence agency would follow
18 any mandate of the Congress or the President. And how can we
19 prepare some mandates that would be followed?

20 That is what this Committee is searching for.

21 Mr. Angleton. I have nothing to contribute to that, sir,
22 beyond what I have said already.

23 Senator Morgan. In other words, you just don't think it
24 can be done. You feel that an intelligence agency has to have
25 unlimited rights to follow their own instincts in gathering

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1 intelligence?

2 Mr. Angleton. No, I do not.

3 Senator Morgan. What limitations would you place on it?

4 Mr. Angleton. I think the mail intercept program is probably
5 one of the few exceptions that I could conceive of.

6 Senator Morgan. But if the Agency will not obey the orders
7 of the President, do you have any suggestions what we can do to
8 assure obedience in the future?

9 Mr. Angleton. Sir, I don't regard the submission to the
10 President as being a black and white matter, because I don't
11 know all of the facts surrounding that.

12 But my reading of that language had a great deal to do with
13 the question of gaps in the pan filled by the FBI in the question
14 of intercepting domestically, mail, rather than as we were doing
15 excepting -- directing it entirely to mail between the United
16 States and Communist countries. And I do draw that distinction.
17 In other words, our motive had nothing whatsoever to do with
18 infringing, or I mean in harming, Americans.

19 Our problem was to try to uncover foreign involvement in
20 this country.

21 Senator Morgan. I believe my time is up. But let me con-
22 clude by observing that I am concerned, from the testimony we
23 have heard today and also from the testimony we have heard in
24 the past, about the fact that it seems that from the testimony
25 that many of these plans are devised and set into being --

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1 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

2 Senator Morgan. And put into practice, and then at some
3 later date, publicly, or for the record, if not publicly, the
4 plans are rejected. But, notwithstanding such rejection, either
5 by the President or some higher authority, all of the plans are
6 carried out anyway. And it makes me wonder whether or not the
7 rejection of such plans is for the purpose -- as Senator Schweiker
8 pointed out -- of plausible denial. Are they really rejections
9 of the plans, or is it a rejection for the purpose of the
10 record? Or if it is a real rejection, then how can we secure
11 compliance with it by the various agencies.

12 Thank you, Mr. Angleton.

13 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Morgan.

14 I think just for purposes of clarifying the matter I ought
15 to say that the names and organizations that I mentioned today
16 as among those that the CIA was opening mail -- and we have
17 found these files, we are now in the process of investigating
18 and preparing ourselves to look into this whole question of mail
19 opening in a much more detailed way -- but at the beginning
20 of this hearing this morning I mentioned such organizations as
21 the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, the Rockefeller Founda-
22 tion, and such individuals as Arthur Burns, Bella Abzug, J.
23 Rockefeller, Richard Nixon, Martin Luther King, and Hubert
24 Humphrey, Senator Edward Kennedy, myself and I would like to
25 make it clear that these names were never on the watch list, so

1 far as we can determine. So, that it is obvious that the opening
2 of the mail was not restricted to any particular watch list, but
3 may have gone very far afield, indeed.

4 I would like to know, for example, and I am going
5 to get that letter I wrote to my mother. I want to see what is
6 in that letter that was of interest to the CIA. And I say this
7 because the privacy of the mail has been one of the most honored
8 practices in this country and it is protected by the statutes.

9 The Supreme Court of the United States passed on this very
10 early in our history, back in 1877. I just would like to read
11 a passage of what the Supreme Court said about the privacy of
12 the mail and the rights of American citizens.

13 It said, Consistently, with rights reserved to the people
14 of far greater importance than the transportation of the mail
15 letters and sealed packages are as fully guarded from examination
16 and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as
17 if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their
18 own domiciles.

19 The constitutional right of the people to be secure in
20 their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends
21 to their papers thus closed to inspection, wherever they may
22 be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined
23 under warrant.

24 I think one of the real responsibilities of this Committee
25 is to make certain that in the future our intelligence agencies

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end t 6⁴

Senator Mathias.

1 recognize that in the name of protecting freedom, they had better
2 honor the Constitution and the laws, because that is what freedom
3 is all about.

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1 Senator Mathias. Mr. Angleton, I suspect that there will be
2 no witnesses come before this Committee who can be of more help
3 to us in understanding the intelligence community as it developed
4 after World War II, and understanding the kind of work that the
5 intelligence community ought to be doing, and in helping us to
6 see what needs to be done in the future. But in understanding
7 exactly how you worked, I think we need to know some of the
8 mundane, mechanical things.

9 For instance, when Mr. Helms was before the Committee last
10 week, we discussed the question of compartmentation, the fact
11 that certain parts of the Central Intelligence Agency were
12 totally compartmented from other parts, and I think it is
13 important to understand exactly what that does to the execution
14 of national policy. For example, if a project would come to you
15 about which some question of legality is raised, was
16 compartmentation such that you could not consult the general
17 counsel for a ruling on legality?

18 Mr. Angleton. I would say that the custom and usage was not
19 to deal with general counsel as a rule until there were some
20 troubles. He was not a part of the process of project approvals.

21 Senator Mathias. There was no preventative practice?

22 Mr. Angleton. Not necessarily.

23 Senator Mathias. So that on this question of opening mail,
24 the question of whether it was legal or illegal never was
25 discussed with the legal officials of the agency?

1 Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge.

2 Senator Mathias. What about relationships with law
3 enforcement agencies outside the Central Intelligence? For
4 instance, in the Huston plan, Mr. Hoover appended a note to the
5 recommendations on mail opening in which he objected to it, and
6 noted that it was illegal, and indicated that he was aware that
7 other agencies might be doing it. Now, if a project of that
8 sort were undertaken, was there any pre-clearance with an agency
9 like the FBI, a law enforcement agency?

10 Mr. Angleton. As it related to this, of course, the Bureau
11 were fully apprised after they were informed in 1958. The Bureau
12 would be -- we would coordinate any domestic activity, or even
13 with the three areas with the FBI in advance. By the same token,
14 they would coordinate with us in advance any overseas activity,
15 and in this respect I was always a firm believer that when the
16 Bureau developed certain intelligence sources, that they should
17 have the operational control over those sources, regardless of
18 geography, as long as there was coordination.

19 Senator Mathias. You are going to lead me to my next
20 question. But before I get to that, would the coordination with
21 the FBI include immunity?

22 Mr. Angleton. It would depend, sir, on the parameters of
23 the operation. If their own interests were impinged upon, there
24 would certainly be coordinations in the community.

25 Senator Mathias. Yes, but would your operator, who might be

1 apprehended in the course of the operation, be understood to be
2 immune from legal prosecution as a result of the coordination
3 with the FBI?

4 Mr. Angleton. You mean for an illegal act in the United
5 States?

6 Senator Mathias. Yes. Was there any agreement that he would
7 not be prosecuted, as would an ordinary citizen who was
8 apprehended in the same act?

9 Mr. Angleton. Well, I must confess that until it was
10 brought out in these hearings, I was unaware of the agreement
11 between the Department of Justice and ourselves, even though I
12 can well understand why there was such an agreement. But in the
13 few cases I do know, I never saw the agency ever interject itself
14 on anything frivolous. In other words, it went to the heart of
15 an operation or to the security of an agent.

16 Senator Mathias. In other words, you are saying that he
17 took his lumps if he was apprehended in any legal difficulties?

18 Mr. Angleton. If he had not been instructed by the agency,
19 and he strayed, he obviously was, to my recollection -- he was
20 subject matter of the General Counsel, taken up with the
21 Department of Justice.

22 Senator Mathias. And when the General Counsel took it up
23 with the Department of Justice, would they -- would it be merely
24 to provide representation in a court of law, or would it be to
25 make some arrangement by which immunity would be granted because

1 of the nature of the duties he had been performing that resulted
2 in the illegal act?

3 Mr. Angleton. I would assume that it would be -- the purpose
4 of this would be for our General Counsel to disgorge all
5 relevant facts and all documents and papers, and present an
6 agency position; and that the argumentation for any special
7 treatment would be supported by the facts.

8 Senator Mathias. And I have been deducing from what you
9 say that you made the best deal that you could at the time,
10 under the circumstances.

11 Mr. Angleton. Not entirely. I have known of -- well, I
12 won't go that far. But there have been cases which have involved,
13 say, misuse of funds or what not, in which the agency, as I
14 recall, threw the party very much to the dogs.

15 Senator Mathias. Right. But those were the cases where
16 there was no relief.

17 Mr. Angleton. Well, they were cases where a superior
18 interest of the government was not harmed.

19 Senator Mathias. I think I understand what you are saying.

20 Now, getting back to the question that you raised a minute
21 ago, in which you said you thought that a source that you
22 develop belonged to you, regardless of where it might happen to
23 lodge geographically, that it could be within the United States,
24 could it not?

25 Mr. Angleton. It could be, and I think that if I might

1 pursue that somewhat --

2 Senator Mathias. Yes, I wish you would tell us how you
3 distinguish between CIA domestic activity that is prohibited by
4 statute, and counterintelligence that may lead you into some
5 domestic scene.

6 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there are many approaches to
7 this. But I would begin first with the agent-principal relation-
8 ship. In other words, when we are dealing with agents, we are
9 not dealing with pieces of merchandise. There are very tenuous
10 psychological realignments between a case officer and his agent,
11 and therefore he is threatened even if you change case officers,
12 let alone the question of jurisdiction.

13 Now, assuming that an agent of ours comes to the United
14 States, we are presented with a problem, therefore, of is he to
15 be transferred to the jurisdiction of the FBI? The moment that
16 the answer is yes, we are subjecting that individual to risk.
17 Now, in the recruitment of that man, it is quite possible -- and
18 in more cases than one -- that he has been given assurances that
19 his identity is only known to a very limited number of people.
20 And on occasions, his identity may only be known to the director,
21 so that this is a case-by-case matter.

22 In other words, we are in a sense the contracting agents for
23 the government, and we do contract, and we do accept conditions
24 of employment. And to our way of thinking, we must abide by it.
25 But in order not to jeopardize the domestic activities of the

1 Bureau, and at the same time to give them the full benefits of
2 the individual, there is a coordinating process with them as to
3 this person. And I have never really known of many cases where
4 there was not agreement.

5 Senator Mathias. So that there was, in fact, a gray area?

6 Mr. Angleton. It is a gray area, but it is a gray area by
7 virtue of the actuality of a principal-agent relationship, not
8 because of jealousies or internecine infighting.

9 Senator Mathias. And there were clearly pragmatic solutions
10 to the problems that arose in the gray area?

11 Mr. Angleton. Correct.

12 Senator Mathias. One final question, Mr. Angleton. If we
13 are to construct an intelligence community for the long-range
14 future, I think we have to understand what the nature of the
15 problem is today. How would you assess the tensions that exist
16 today between the United States and potential antagonists or
17 enemies in the world; the kind of tensions that create the basic
18 intelligence problem with which we have to cope?

19 Mr. Angleton. This would open up an extremely complicated
20 channel of discussion.

21 Senator Mathias. I think it is important that we try to
22 grapple with it, no matter how complicated it is.

23 Mr. Angleton. If I may go off on a tangent for a moment, I
24 have observed the hearings as printed in the press being conducted
25 by the Congress, Congressman Pike; and with the exception of the

1 security leakage which was highlighted by a press interview and
2 what not, I would say that he is probing the intelligence
3 community in the most productive avenue of evaluation, and that
4 is the question of estimates, as to whether the American public
5 are receiving an adequate return for their investment. And I
6 would suggest that if we are unable, in less sophisticated areas
7 of the world, to arrive at accurate evaluation of the outbreak of
8 wars, you can then have some slide rule as to our ability to
9 cover the Communist bloc, which is composed of 27 different
10 intelligence and security organizations, which deploys hundreds
11 of thousands of secret police, both by way of troops.

12 And where we have the major challenge in every aspect of the
13 running of an agent -- communications -- the possibility of
14 leakages; and I would also note that two agents of the agency
15 were most productive for a short time, but were discovered and
16 executed. I call attention to the inquiry that is going there,
17 because I have followed it with very, very great interest,
18 because I think it is hitting the nerve of the problem; namely,
19 are we getting the production, and are we having the proper
20 estimates?

21 Now, relating this to the Soviet, our information --

22 Senator Mathias. I would just call your attention, I think,
23 to the fact that cost of intelligence, the cost of the product
24 is not only money. It can be in risk, as was demonstrated by the
25 Gary Powers U-2 incident. It can be in damage to our own

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1 constitutional process, which is one of the elements of cost that
2 I think we are trying to determine here.

3 Mr. Angleton. I think that as far as the Bloc is concerned,
4 you have a unified approach to the United States as the main
5 enemy. They are bound together by ideological ties. There has
6 been a process of de-Stalinization which was concluded in 1959,
7 which reconciled vast differences, and which in essence was a
8 return to Leninism. There was enunciated the policy of the main
9 enemy, and the main enemy was the United States. And all agents
10 working in Bloc countries who priorly had been working on small
11 members of NATO were redirected against the main target.

12 Recently in the newspaper, there was the announcement of
13 the defection of a Romanian intelligence officer, in Oslo and
14 there has been a major flap. And one can ask oneself the question
15 that if Romania is so independent of Moscow and moving away from
16 it, why is it that their intelligence service, which is most
17 reflective of their Central Committee, is working hand in glove
18 with the Soviets?

19 Now, this is not speculation. These are facts. There have
20 been agents captured playing out these roles who are now in jail,
21 and it has shown total cohesiveness within the Bloc in terms of
22 strategic questionnaires of no possible use to Romania. Romania,
23 however, has received Most Favored Nation, and it also received
24 the visit recently of the President, not too far distant from the
25 arrest in Oslo of the intelligence officer.

1 So I come back again to the nature of this threat. The
2 nature of the threat rests within some thousands of pages of
3 interrogation of very high-level Soviet and Bloc intelligence
4 officers who were, in turn, very close in their activities to the
5 political guidance of the central committees. And this
6 cohesiveness dates from the period of 1959, when the intelligence
7 services were changed from being the protectors or the preservers
8 of the cult of personality of Stalin, and reverted back again to
9 the days of Dzhukovsky and the revolution and Lenin, where every
10 intelligence operation has a political objective.

11 And it ties together with the entire philosophy -- and I do
12 not base this on reading information available at the corner
13 drug store; this comes from the interrogation of individuals who
14 were in the system and had positions of high responsibility in
15 intelligence -- and the underpinning of those regimes are their
16 intelligence and security services.

17 So, in conclusion, I would suggest that some day -- and I
18 know that I have proposed many things here which will never see
19 the light of day -- that the nature of the threat be diagnosed
20 with a view that this country, having taken stock of those
21 problems, and being faced -- as I think Dr. Schlesinger has
22 eloquently put it -- with the possible change of the balance of
23 military power; and I hope and I believe that some of his speeches
24 on these matters were gained by him -- the views -- during his
25 short tenure as the director of Central Intelligence, where he

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and t. 1 was an avid reader of the secret information that I refer to.

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1 The Chairman. Senator, your time has expired.

2 The Committee's concern in this investigation, Mr. Angleton,
3 is the nature of the threat to be sure --

4 Mr. Angleton. Pardon me?

5 The Chairman. The Committee's concern in this investiga-
6 tion is the threat -- the nature of the threat, to be sure.
7 And an efficient intelligence organization is needed for this
8 country -- that is not the issue here.

9 What is at issue here is running it in such a way that
10 we don't slowly become a kind of police state you have
11 described.

12 Mr. Angleton. I understand, Mr. Chairman. I was only
13 responding to Senator Mathias.

14 The Chairman. Yes.

15 But I just wanted to emphasize that our concern is that
16 this country should never slide down that slippery slope that
17 finally ends us up with the kind of police state you have
18 described, and that is the whole reason that this investigation
19 has been undertaken.

20 Now Senator Hart.

21 Senator Hart (Colorado). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 At the close of the questioning I would like to raise a
23 matter of Committee business concerning a future witness, but
24 I will await the conclusion of the questioning on that.

25 Mr. Angleton, the justification -- much of the justification

1 for domestic intelligence and surveillance during the sixties
2 and early seventies was based upon foreign contacts. I would
3 like to quote, first of all, a letter from Mr. Helms to Mr.
4 Hoover, dated March 20th, 1970 -- I think at the dawn of the
5 Huston era. You have it in your materials at Tab D in the
6 brown book.

7 Page five, paragraph eight, entitled "New Left and Racial
8 Matters".

9 Mr. Helms says, "there is already a substantial exchange
10 of information in this field", and then skipping a sentence,
11 he says, "The increasingly close connection between these
12 forces in the United States", presumably meaning the new left
13 and racial groups, "and hostile elements abroad has been well
14 established by both of our agencies".

15 And now, Mr. Angleton, in your deposition before this
16 Committee, you said as follows: "Within the Agency itself,
17 there were those who took a very staunch stand that there was
18 no foreign involvement." And then, skipping a line, "And
19 these were fairly senior individuals, mainly on the overt side
20 of the business. Their attitude was very definitely that there
21 was nothing to it, namely, foreign contact."

22 Are we to believe the Helms correspondence to Mr. Hoover
23 in March of '70, or your deposition before this Committee,
24 as to the belief of the Agency in foreign involvement of domestic
25 groups?

1 Mr. Angleton. Pardon me, sir. The last part?

2 Senator Hart (Colorado). Are we to believe your deposition
3 before this Committee, or Mr. Helms' letter to Director Hoover
4 in March of 1970, as to the extent of foreign involvement in
5 domestic groups?

6 Mr. Angleton. It is not inconceivable -- I mean, I cannot
7 reconstruct this paragraph and put it in the timeframe that
8 you have posed it. But it is not inconceivable that Mr. Helms
9 did have disagreements with those senior people on the overt
10 side, or that he had access to the content of mail intercept
11 which would, of course, not be in their possession.

12 I mean, that is one explanation.

13 Senator Hart (Colorado). I mean, his letter leaves almost
14 no avenue open for question as to the degree of contact. He
15 said, "it is well established".

16 Mr. Angleton. It is difficult to read this copy to begin
17 with. It has been mimeographed.

18 Mr. Brown. May we have just a moment, Senator, while
19 the witness peruses the document?

20 Senator Hart (Colorado). Mr. Angleton, let me rephrase
21 the question.

22 Was it, or was it not, well established in the spring of
23 1970 that domestic groups, so described the new left and
24 racial groups, had substantial foreign contact?

25 Mr. Angleton. There were a number of people from these

1 groups who traveled to Moscow and to North Korea, and travelled
2 abroad.

3 Senator Hart (Colorado). And they had contact with "hostile
4 elements"?

5 Mr. Angleton. It is my understanding, not having reviewed
6 the mail intercepts, that it involved exhortations for violence.
7 That it involved sending letters from the United States to
8 Soviet institutions, inviting them to support the group in the
9 United States by destroying U. S. property in Moscow and in
10 other countries, and keeping them advised of their own plans
11 and actions.

12 Senator Hart (Colorado). Then why did senior --

13 Mr. Angleton. Excuse me.

14 Senator Hart (Colorado). Go right ahead.

15 Mr. Angleton. It's also come out in mail intercept that
16 certain groups went to Moscow for political indoctrination
17 and they went to North Korea for weaponry.

18 Senator Hart (Colorado). Then how could senior officials
19 in the CIA conclude that there was absolutely no foreign
20 involvement?

21 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, there are many who believed
22 that the foreign involvement matter was immaterial to the --

23 Senator Hart (Colorado). That is not what your deposition
24 said.

25 Mr. Angleton. Well I thought my deposition stated that;

1 that there were senior officials in the Agency who would not
2 buy it.

3 Senator Hart (Colorado). They didn't say it was insub-
4 stantial; they say it didn't exist. "There was no foreign
5 involvement."

6 The attitude is very definitely that there was nothing
7 to it.

8 Mr. Angleton. I think it could be qualified as stating
9 that the counterintelligence data which they received -- and I
10 don't know what they received -- did not strike them as
11 sufficient to go on this investigation of leftwing groups in
12 this country.

13 In other words, they were opposed to it.

14 Senator Hart (Colorado). Mr. Angleton, the record before
15 us strongly suggests that there was not only one Huston Plan,
16 but there may have been several operating almost simultaneously.

17 I refer to your deposition before the Committee in which
18 you say, "What I'm trying to explain is that people are reading
19 a lot into the Huston Plan and, at the same time, are unaware
20 that on several levels in a community identical" -- I suppose
21 you mean in the community?

22 Mr. Angleton. I've not read it, so I don't know what --

23 Senator Hart (Colorado). I'm reading the transcript.
24 "identical bilateral discussions were going on." That is,
25 between yourselves and the FBI. "In other words, the Huston

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1 Plan did not affect one way or the other the normal flow of
2 business."

3 I also refer to --

4 Mr. Angleton. I don't think there was any -- I'm afraid
5 I don't have the time sequence here.

-6 Mr. Brown. May we ask for a page reference for that
7 statement?

8 Senator Hart (Colorado). That was page one hundred and --
9 well, there are two page references: 103, I think, in the
10 deposition.

11 Mr. Brown. This was the deposition of September 12th, is
12 that correct?

13 Senator Hart (Colorado). Yes, that is correct.

14 Mr. Angleton. What is the question, sir?

15 Senator Hart (Colorado). Let me complete my question.

16 In addition to that testimony which you have already
17 given, I refer to a March 29, 1971 memorandum for the files
18 from Director Hoover.

19 He says, and I quote, "This meeting has been requested by
20 Mr. Helms and was for the purpose of discussing a broadening
21 of operations, particularly of the very confidential type
22 in covering intelligence, both domestic and foreign. There
23 was some discussion on the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage
24 of mail."

25 Then I also refer to the Helms letter that I quoted in the

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1 previous question that was a March 1970 letter.

2 What all of this suggests, Mr. Angleton -- and I think
3 the Committee would be interested in whether the facts support
4 that -- that not only was the so-called Huston group the
5 inter-Agency task force operating on the question of what
6 restraints should be lifted, but, in fact, there were constant
7 contacts going on, formally and informally, between the CIA,
8 the FBI and perhaps other agencies -- NSA and others -- about
9 similar ongoing domestic intelligence programs.

10 Is it safe for us to conclude that not only are we dealing
11 with one Huston Plan, but in fact, less formally, perhaps
12 several?

13 Mr. Angleton. Since the creation of the Agency, there has
14 been constant discussion of operations and improvement of
15 collection, so there is nothing unusual in time. The fact that
16 this, from '47 on, was still taking place.

17 Senator Hart (Colorado). Was it possible Mr. Huston was
18 just being duped by the Agency into thinking that the White
19 House was aware of what was going on, when, in fact, the
20 agencies were having discussions of their own behind the back
21 of the White House officials as to what should be done about
22 domestic surveillance?

23 Mr. Angleton. Well I think that answer could only be
24 had if Mr. Huston had been asked to explain in great detail,
25 chronologically, his contacts with the FBI and the subjects of

1 discussion. I do not believe that he could have met with Mr.
2 Sullivan, and not have been exposed to all of these matters of
3 operations a year prior to the Huston Plan.

4 I know Mr. Sullivan very well, and he doesn't usually
5 waste his time.

6 Senator Hart (Colorado). Mr. Huston has testified under
7 oath, and therefore subjected himself to perjury charges, that
8 he didn't --

9 Mr. Angleton. I'm not suggesting that the actual language
10 he used could not be also interpreted to remove any taint of
11 perjury. I am simply stating that I have known for a long
12 time that he was very close to Mr. Sullivan, and I do know what
13 Mr. Sullivan's concerns were in terms of gaps within the
14 community. And simply because there was a Huston Plan, there
15 were a number of ongoing bilateral discussions every day with
16 other elements within the intelligence community which may or
17 may not have duplicated the broad, general plan that Huston
18 brought about.

19 Senator Hart (Colorado). One final question.

20 Mr. Angleton, are you familiar with the name Thomas Riha,
21 R-i-h-a?

22 Mr. Angleton. I am, indeed.

23 Senator Hart (Colorado). And you are aware of the fact
24 that the so-called Thomas Riha case played a key role in the
25 breach of liason between the CIA and the FBI?

1 Mr. Angleton. I am.

2 Senator Hart (Colorado). Do you have any information for
3 this Committee as to what happened to Professor Thomas Riha?

4 Mr. Angleton. What has happened to the subject?

5 Senator Hart (Colorado). What happened to him; he has
6 disappeared.

7 Mr. Angleton. I haven't heard anything. I have not
8 actually inquired, but I have no knowledge. I think I heard
9 speculation at one time, but it was back, more or less, in the
10 Res gestar of this trouble, that he was in Czechoslovakia,
11 but I do not know.

12 Senator Hart (Colorado). In your previous deposition you
13 stated that the counterintelligence information was only as
14 good as relations between the FBI and the CIA. That is a
15 paraphrase of what you said. And the fact that there were
16 termination of relationships between Mr. Hoover, the FBI and
17 the CIA in the spring of '70 over the Riha case, I think it
18 makes it one that this Committee might look into with some
19 degree of intensity.

20 That is all, Mr. Chairman.

21 Mr. Angleton. I would like to suggest, Senator, that it
22 was much deeper than that. It was a cutting off of all liaison
23 within the intelligence community with the exception of the
24 White House.

25 Senator Hart (Colorado). Over this one case?

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1 Mr. Angleton. Over this one case.

2 Once having established the principal with us, then it
3 was simply a matter of a short period of time when the liaison
4 office itself was done away with within the Bureau.

5 Senator Hart (Colorado). Mr. Chairman, I have a matter of
6 Committee business that I will take up at the appropriate time.

7 Thank you.

8 The Chairman. What is the matter you want to bring up?

9 Senator Hart (Colorado). It has to do with an additional
10 witness before this Committee on this subject. But if there
11 are further questions, you may want to go to those first. I
12 don't know.

13 The Chairman. Very well.

14 If there are further questions let us take them first.

15 Senator Tower?

16 Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, was the purpose of mail
17 intercept both for intelligence and counterintelligence
18 purposes?

19 Mr. Angleton. Yes sir.

20 Senator Tower. Was there a feeling that the Soviets
21 relied on a lack of authorization from the government to open
22 mail, and therefore, widely used the mail system?

23 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

24 Senator Tower. I say, was it true that it was felt that
25 the Soviet Union relied on the lack of authorization to open

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1 mail, and, therefore, used the mails widely?

2 Mr. Angleton. My assumption is that much of the mail
3 and the content of the mail would not have come to us if they
4 were aware of the program.

5 Senator Tower. Now returning to the comment at page 29 of
6 the Huston Plan, the report noted that "covert coverage had
7 been discontinued due to publicity arising from Congressional
8 hearings on privacy".

9 Now you have testified that you believe this reference
10 related to FBI mail openings. Is that correct?

11 Mr. Angleton. I say that it is my impression that the
12 thrust of that related directly to the Bureau's having abandoned
13 the mail intercept program domestically.

14 Senator Tower. Now is it your belief that disclosure of
15 the CIA continuing efforts, the continuing intercept, to a
16 working group, including representatives of other agencies,
17 might lead the Soviets and others to discontinue use of the
18 mails, and thus, depriving the United States of an important
19 source of intelligence?

20 Mr. Angleton. I'm sorry, I don't quite get the thrust of
21 this questioning.

22 Senator Tower. Well, in other words, the fact that you
23 continued to do this and did not let anyone else know that the
24 Agency did, was that because you felt that the Soviets might
25 get wind of it and, therefore, discontinue the use of the mails,

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1 and, therefore, deny us an important intelligence source?

2 Mr. Angleton. I would say that does represent my analysis
3 of the situation because I am quite confident -- for example,
4 we had in the Weathermen case, Catherine Boudien, who, in
5 Greenwich Village, was a part of the Weathermen group building
6 bombs. The bombs went up, and she and another person, a woman,
7 fled from the house, and she was identified as one of the
8 people fleeing from the house. And those were the facts -- the
9 only facts -- in possession of the FBI dealing with a bomb-
10 making house in Greenwich Village.

11 Now, when we went back and continued -- or went back into
12 our mail intercept program, we found that she had written from
13 Moscow some 30 to 40 letters to people in the United States,
14 and these were the only leads that the FBI had that were in
15 any way important. And to this day she is a fugitive from
16 justice.

17 It would raise in anyone's counterintelligence mind as
18 to whether she is in Moscow, but she is an active fugitive
19 from justice.

20 Senator Tower. Now during working group sessions, did
21 anyone, at any time, ask you whether the CIA was conducting
22 covert mail coverage?

23 Mr. Angleton. Pardon, sir?

24 Senator Tower. During working group sessions, did anyone,
25 at any time, ask you if the CIA was engaged in covert mail

1 operations?

2 Mr. Angleton. I don't recall, myself. I mean, I don't
3 recall that and I don't recall details on how we arranged with
4 the Bureau -- or the verbage in that report in a way that
5 would hide our use of the mails.

6 Senator Tower. Now did you at any time receive instructions,
7 or attempt on your own initiative, to mislead the President on
8 the issue of covert mail coverage conducted by the CIA?

9 Mr. Angleton. It is very difficult for me to respond to
10 that because I do not have the facts as to the -- as to what
11 we were going to do regarding this question of including within
12 the Huston project the fact that the FBI were recipients of
13 our mail coverage.

14 I find it, therefore, very difficult to know how to
15 reply to your question. I do know -- and I think that this
16 was my conviction at all times -- that if there was ever an
17 audience with the President of the United States to go over
18 internal security in this counterespionage matter, there would
19 never be anything withheld from him.

20 Senator Tower. So you were never ordered to, nor did you
21 ever on your own, attempt to mislead the President in this
22 matter?

23 Mr. Angleton. I did not.

24 Senator Tower. Thank you.

25 The Chairman. Senator Mondale?

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1 Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Mr. Angleton, would it be fair to say that starting, say,
3 in 1967, with the rise in anti-war protests, that the CIA, the
4 FBI and the other intelligence agencies were placed under
5 tremendous pressure by the White House to investigate and
6 determine the source of these protests?

7 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

8 Senator Mondale. So that while we ask questions about
9 what you did in your department, it has to be placed in the
10 context of what you referred to earlier as the mood and the
11 temper and the fear of the times.

12 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

13 Senator Mondale. I think that has to be understood,
14 because I think it is quite obvious that the Presidents --
15 starting with Mr. Johnson in the beginning of the high rise
16 in protests -- tended to interpret those protests as being
17 foreign inspired. I don't have all of the documents with me
18 by any means, but here is the memorandum from Mr. Huston to
19 the President on June 20, 1969, stating -- this is to the
20 Director of the FBI, but he quotes the President.

21 "The President has directed that a report on foreign
22 communist support of revolutionary protest movements in this
23 country be prepared for his study. Support should be liberally
24 construed to include all activities by foreign communists
25 designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protests."

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1 And then I have a document here which we have just
2 obtained from President Nixon's files, entitled "Presidential
3 Talking Papers", on June 5, 1970, and this is the description
4 of what he apparently told Mr. Hoover, Helms, General Bennett
5 and Admiral Gayler.

6 He said, "We are now confronted with a new and grave
7 crisis in our country; one which we know too little about.
8 Certainly hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans, mostly
9 under 30, are determined to destroy our society. They find in
10 many of the legitimate greivances of our citizenry opportunities
11 for exploitation which never escape the attention of demagogues.
12 They are reaching out for the support -- ideological and
13 otherwise -- of foreign powers, and they are developing their
14 own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism which is as
15 dangerous as anything they could import from Cuba, China or
16 the Soviet Union."

17 And then, among other things, he says, or his talking
18 papers indicate he says, "Third, our people, perhaps as a
19 reaction to the excesses of the McCarthy Era, are unwilling to
20 admit the possibility that their children could wish to destroy
21 their country, and this is particularly true of the media and
22 the academic community."

23 In other words, this is a reflection of the President's
24 attitude that there was a possibility that thousands of
25 American youth desired to destroy this country.

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1 Do you have any doubt that that is the motivation of
2 Presidential Orders and the temper of orders during that time?

3 Mr. Angleton. None whatsoever.

4 Senator Mondale. And if that is their view, namely, that
5 the American people increasingly -- including the media and
6 the parents -- could not be trusted to perceive this threat,
7 doesn't a series of agencies, uncontrolled by the law, reaching
8 out to apprehend a threat which was at the very -- what they
9 perceived to threaten the very survival of democracy, an
10 exceedingly dangerous tool, indeed?

11 Mr. Angleton. Would you repeat the first part of that
12 question?

13 Senator Mondale. Well, if I were a President, and I
14 believed there were thousands of American youth wishing to
15 destroy American society, and the parents couldn't see what
16 the kids were up to, and the media wouldn't understand what
17 they were up to, wouldn't I likely proceed to use agencies
18 such as the CIA to move in most exaggerated and intensive ways
19 to try and meet this threat?

20 Mr. Angleton. I think that is correct, and that is the
21 reason why earlier I referred to the strong statement made
22 by Mr. Huston to us that we were not complying with the
23 President's request.

24 I do not have a record of those first meetings as to
25 anyone raising problems or political differences, but I know

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1 there was -- the question of political implications was raised
2 and discussed and they were knocked down by him.

3 Senator Mondale. Yes. Because I think while we probe,
4 as we should, in hard and intensive ways with persons such as
5 yourself who have worked in these agencies, the truth of it is
6 that this problem began in the White House with the concern
7 on the part of the President that these protests came, not
8 from legitimate concerns of Americans against the war, but
9 probably were inspired by foreign support and leadership. And
10 thus, were compromised and corrupted expressions, rather than
11 the good faith protests of Americans concerned about that war.

12 And I think that attitude shows how dangerous it is to
13 have agencies which themselves do not feel that they are bound
14 by the restrictions of the law. That attitude, that fear,
15 that distrust of the American people, coupled with agencies
16 which feel they are not restrained by the law, I think is a
17 road map to disaster.

18 Mr. Angleton. Senator, I would like to make just one
19 comment.

20 I believe that the depths of the President's feelings were
21 in part, justified because of the ignorance, so to speak, in
22 the west regarding these matters. In other words, the quality
23 of intelligence going to him he found totally unsatisfactory.

24 Senator Mondale. That's right. Because it did not square
25 with his paranoia that the American people were trying to

1 destroy the country, and in fact, there was never any evidence
2 of any significance that that paranoia was justified. And that
3 is what I think has been the traditional dispute in maintaining
4 a democracy -- whether you restrain power lest it be turned on
5 the people, or whether you restrain power because you trust
6 the people in the long run as the primary salvation of society.

7 And I think this document, expressing as it does enormous
8 unrestricted paranoid fear about the American people, is an
9 excellent expression of why we have to have laws that restrain
10 the action of the President. Because, really, you were an
11 agent of the President in all of these matters.

12 Mr. Angleton. Mr. Senator, I do believe that it is
13 difficult to judge the President on the basis of that document.
14 I am certain that anyone who has his responsibilities, and was
15 receiving in-depth, around the clock reports from all over the
16 United States, of bombings and civil unrest and murders -- and
17 I can go all the way down the long, grizzly list --

18 Senator Mondale. Oh, yes. But --

19 Mr. Angleton. You can induce that, but it was not, in
20 my view, paranoia.

21 Senator Mondale. Do you think the possibility that there
22 were thousands of American children under 30 determined to
23 destroy our society is not paranoia?

24 Mr. Angleton. I will not take that out of context.

25 The overall purpose of that talking paper was to address

19

1 it to intelligence collectors, the heads of agencies. And it
2 was to give them a hot foot of getting down to business and
3 supplying facts. And those facts were very difficult to come
4 by.

5 Outside of the mail intercept program, there was very
6 little hard, incontrovertible evidence. There was nothing
7 known regarding Cleaver's operations, his stay in Algiers, his
8 dealing with Soviet bloc countries, his going to North Korea,
9 and other activities of this sort. And these were hard facts.

10 Senator Mondale. But as an old law enforcement officer,
11 Mr. Angleton, I can tell you there are ways of going after those
12 people based on probable suspicions entirely consistent with
13 the laws and the Constitution, without undertaking efforts of
14 the kind that were recommended here that were shot-gun, unrestrained
15 and unconcerned about the Constitution.

16 We have ways of taking care of people who resort to
17 violence in this country, and this way is not one of them
18 permitted by the Constitution.

19 There is one other problem that bothers me, and that is
20 this. What was really the problem in 1967 to the end of that
21 war was that Americans were bad people and therefore had to be
22 spied on, or was it that we had a bad war that needed to be
23 stopped? And what I think this reflects is, instead of a
24 President asking himself, is there something wrong with this
25 war, that is creating these protests, instead of that they said

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1 there is something wrong with the protestors, they are getting
2 foreign money, foreign directions, foreign spies, and therefore
3 what we need is more counterintelligence. And that may have
4 delayed the day when Presidents realized the need to change
5 and end that war.

6 The Chairman. I might just say, Senator, I think your
7 point is well taken and we might just remind ourselves of the
8 Constitutional duty of the President.

9 Mr. Angleton. Pardon me, sir?

10 The Chairman. I say, we might just remind ourselves of
11 the Constitutional duty of the President. It is not just
12 perceive threats and then think up ways to deal with them
13 outside of the law. The Constitutional duty of the President
14 is that he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
15 And when he takes his Oath of Office as President of the
16 United States, he takes the following Oath:

17 I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the
18 Office of President of the United States and will, to the best
19 of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution
20 of the United States.

21 Those are his duties.

22 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand.

23 The Chairman. And when Mr. Nixon approved the Huston
24 Plan, he forgot those duties. And when Mr. Mitchell, the
25 Attorney General of the United States, was informed of the

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1 illegal opening of the mail a year later, as the chief law
2 enforcement officer of the United States, he forgot those
3 duties too.

4 Are there further questions?

5 Senator Mathias?

6 Senator Mathias. Mr. Angleton, I think you raised a very
7 important and useful question when you pointed to the issue of
8 measuring the value of the intelligence you received against the
9 cost of producing it, and I have always felt, from the inception
10 of this study, that that would have to be one of the major
11 elements of our consideration.

12 I would suggest, as I did a few minutes ago, that that
13 cost has to be measured in more than just dollars. It has to
14 be measured in the financial cost -- what it costs the taxpayers --
15 it has to be measured in the kind of risks that it exposes the
16 United States to; risks of various kinds. It may be loss of
17 personnel, loss of equipment, loss of face, loss of prestige,
18 various kinds of risks; ultimately the risk of war.

19 And finally, of course, the third element which you have
20 just been discussing with Senator Mondale. The question of
21 the cost in terms of erosion of the Constitutional process.

22 But for our purposes today I am wondering if you could tell
23 us how you, in your career, went about assessing the cost
24 of intelligence that you felt might be procured in terms of
25 risk to the United States. How would you make that delicate

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1 balance between what you wanted to know and thought would be
2 useful for this government to know against what we might lose
3 in the process of getting it?

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, sir, I think those of us who were in
5 the war had the advantage of having been back-stopped by
6 thousands of troops in the event of error. And I might add
7 that that is a testing ground that younger people in intelligence
8 have not had.

9 In other words, when they embark on operations they are
10 apt to not have the period of trial and error. I would say
11 that all of the officers I have known in my experience in the
12 Central Intelligence Agency, particularly in counterintelligence,
13 have a very acute sense of making this judgment factor.

14 That is, we have handled so many cases that it builds up
15 sort of a body of expertise in its own right as to how much
16 you will risk to go after certain targets.

17 Naturally the highest quality of intelligence that exists
18 is in the field of radio signals and related matters. And
19 then it goes in descending order of documents and to individuals
20 who have had great access, or access. Now all of these
21 matters have to be brought to bear on what the expectancy will
22 be, what one expects from the operation.

23 When the risks get very great, without exception that is
24 taken to the Director. And then, if he has to seek outside
25 guidance or consultation, he does so. And Mr. McCone was a

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1 great stickler for being brought in when anything reached a
2 Cabinet level decision.

3 Senator Mathias. Now when we talk about a risk being very
4 great, are we talking about the chance of losing an airplane and
5 a pilot, or are we talking about the chance of involving this
6 country, in a serious way, with another government?

7 Mr. Angleton. Well, I'm --

8 Senator Mathias. I'm trying to get some scale of values
9 that would be considered.

10 Mr. Angleton. Obviously, anything that sets back the
11 prestige of this country is almost controlling in terms of the
12 Director's final decision. I mean, if the risk is one that is
13 going to undermine the prestige of the United States, I don't
14 know of any Director who would not take that up with Dr. Kissinger,
15 or with the National Security Council, or the 40 Committee, or
16 with the President.

17 But I think there is great responsibility within the
18 Agency. I mean, I make no excuses regarding going ahead on the
19 matters of illegal mail coverage, but that is a very small
20 part, and I am not excusing it, of our activity.

21 Senator Mathias. Going back into history, to pick up
22 another example in which this kind of evaluation of what you
23 might learn as against what you might risk is involved, do
24 you know how that was weighed in the Gary Powers U-2 flight?

25 Mr. Angleton. It is purely hearsay. It is simply that a

1 decision was made by the President.

2 Senator Mathias. We are not bound by the hearsay rules
3 here.

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, I at least would like to so label it.
5 But it is my understanding -- and I know Mr. Dulles quite well
6 in this regard, because later on it was my man who handled
7 Gary Powers as to his debriefing -- and what happened, it is
8 my understanding that the question of the U-2 flights -- and
9 I may be wrong on this -- were cleared with the President in
10 terms of his own activities -- in this case, his travels to
11 Paris to meet Khrushchev.

12 And I would say the history of the Agency is sprinkled
13 with cases which have gone forward and which have been cancelled
14 or changed because of some overriding political factor.

15 Senator Mathias. So it is your considered judgment that
16 the question of the exposure of an important national interest
17 is consistently weighed when a project is undertaken?

18 Mr. Angleton. Yes, but I would like to draw attention to
19 the recommendation of the Rockefeller Commission, of which I
20 happen to be much in favor. And that is that there be two
21 Deputy Directors who would be approved by the Congress, one
22 military and one civilian. And I would say there is very much
23 need to have accessible a Director who can take the time to
24 go into the nuts and bolts, because his absence means that
25 there will be this slippage. And I think there is more than

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1 enough business for two Deputy Directors to be fully occupied.

2 Senator Mathias. Who can measure this element of cost
3 before --

4 Mr. Angleton. But who are looking into the Agency. Not
5 being in the Agency looking out into the community. And there
6 is a very proper role for the overall DCI. But I think Mr.
7 Colby would be the first to admit that the burdens which he
8 has had since he assumed the Directorship -- that he has been
9 able to give a very small percentage of his time to the actual
10 workings of the Agency.

11 The Chairman. Senator Hart?

12 Senator Hart (Colorado). Mr. Chairman, the so-called
13 Huston Plan has been called one of the most dangerous documents
14 in the history of this Republic.

15 Mr. Huston testified that the President did not know that
16 questionable surveillance techniques were being used prior to
17 the development of this plan; that he thought when the order
18 was given to terminate them that they were terminated. There
19 is other testimony and evidence about what the President knew
20 or did not know.

21 As I think all of us have tried to indicate to the
22 people of this country, the principal part of our concern is
23 the question of command and control. Who is in charge? Who
24 gives what orders? Are they carried out? And if they are not
25 carried out, why not?

One of our -- I think it gets down in this case to a phrase that one of our distinguished members used in another context with regard to the same President. What did he know, and when did he know it? And I have felt since the beginning, personally, as a member of this Committee, that we stand in danger constantly of repeating a kind of perennial government pattern of when something goes wrong, or when there are governmental abuses, that the politicians and elected officials take it out on the appointed people, the career people, in various departments or agencies. And I think we, particularly, stand in constant danger of doing that in this case and in other cases that we will look at.

I frankly don't find it very tasteful, and I don't think the American people will. If all we accomplish is public and private thrashing of people like Mr. Angleton and Mr. Huston and others, whether they deserve it or not, that is not our function, particularly.

I think the question gets down to who was giving what orders, what people at the highest levels of government, particularly the elected officials, knew or did not know about this plan and other activities, and were the abuses shared equally among or in part by elected officials with appointed officials.

Consequently, Mr. Chairman, although I do not intend at this point to seek its immediate consideration, I would move to ask this Committee to consider using all methods within its

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1 authority and control to seek the presence of former President
2 Nixon before this Committee.
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1 The Chairman. I think the point is well taken, and I
2 personally concur in the Senator's views. I think that in the
3 Huston Plan Mr. Nixon was the central figure. We can get and
4 are getting testimony as to what he appeared to have known and
5 the representations that were made to him and what he appeared
6 to authorize and then revoke, but he is the best witness as to
7 what his intentions were, and he is the ultimate witness as to
8 what he was told and what he was not told, and for that reason
9 I concur fully in the Senator's view.

10 Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman.

11 The Chairman. Yes, Senator Tower.

12 Senator Tower. I think this is a matter that should be
13 taken up in a closed business session of the Committee so it can
14 be fully discussed in that context and not to engage in a
15 discussion of it here or a resolution of the matter here.

16 The Chairman. Well, the matter has been raised. As I
17 understood Senator Hart to say he is not going to press for an
18 immediate vote.

19 Senator, have you made a motion?

20 Senator Hart (Colorado). The motion is made, and I do not
21 intend to press it in this session.

22 The Chairman. At this time.

23 Is there any further discussion that members would like
24 to --

25 Senator Mathias. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can only say that I

1 personally asked Mr. Nixon about the Huston Plan, and I hope the
2 Committee has more luck than I have had as an individual in
3 getting any information on it.

4 The Chairman. Well, we have also asked for other
5 information, and we have had to subpoena some of it, as the
6 Senator knows. I think that we will just have to find out if
7 the former President is willing to come and tell us about this
8 and his part in it, what he knew about it.

9 Senator Mathias. I do think this, Mr. Chairman, if you
10 would yield.

11 The Chairman. And ultimately, of course, we have to face
12 the question of a subpoena in the event that he declines to do
13 so.

14 Senator Tower. Well, well, Mr. Chairman, I do not think
15 we should discuss that further here and raise publicly the
16 threat of a subpoena and all of that because I think the matter
17 can be resolved privately and should be. If we get into the
18 business of a subpoena, we are looking at a long court battle
19 that could go on well beyond the life of this Committee as
20 authorized by the Congress.

21 There are ways to do things and ways not to, and I think
22 we ought to explore every means short of that before we even
23 suggest that we consider a subpoena.

24 The Chairman. Well, I think that the Senator is not going
25 to press his motion at this time, and I feel we should take it up

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1 more fully and consider the proper step to take, and that then
2 the Committee should make its decision, and that decision will be
3 announced publicly as soon as it is made.

4 Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman.

5 The Chairman. Is that agreeable to the Committee?

6 Senator Mathias. I would just make this comment, that this
7 of course is not the first time that the question of Mr. Nixon's
8 testimony has been raised in this Committee. We have talked
9 about it on several occasions, and I think it was Marlowe who
10 said, But at my back I always hear Time's winged chariot
11 hovering near.

12 Now, this Committee has got to some day make a report.
13 Time is moving very rapidly, and I would suggest to the Chair
14 that we schedule the appropriate amount of time to discuss this
15 subject and then make a decision one way or the other.

16 The Chairman. Very well, that will be done, if there is
17 no further objection. That is the decision of the Chair. As soon
18 as the Committee has reached its decision, an appropriate
19 announcement will be made.

20 If there are no further questions --

21 Senator Huddleston. Mr. Chairman.

22 The Chairman. Oh, Senator Huddleston, do you have a
23 further question?

24 Senator Huddleston. May I ask one further question that I
25 did not get to during my allotted time?

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1 Mr. Angleton, the Huston Plan was an operative policy of
2 the White House for some five days.

3 Mr. Angleton. Yes, five days.

4 Senator Huddleston. During that time were there any
5 internal instructions or memoranda or direction given within the
6 CIA relating to implementing that plan?

7 Mr. Angleton. None to my knowledge.

8 Senator Huddleston. None to your knowledge.

9 When the President rescinded his authorization, following
10 that time were there any internal memoranda involving
11 instructions or directions within the CIA?

12 Mr. Angleton. No.

13 Senator Huddleston. So it is accurate to say that the
14 Huston Plan presumably could have been implemented by the CIA
15 without any further directions in addition to what they were
16 already doing, and that there were in fact no directions
17 cancelling any effort that might have been started relative to
18 that plan?

19 It is almost as if the status quo maintained from the
20 beginning to the end before and after without any actions being
21 taken.

22 Mr. Angleton. With one exception, Senator, and that is that
23 the plan marched up the hill and then it marched back again, and
24 this was one of the few times that any programs involving
25 counterintelligence, interagency counterintelligence, were ever

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1 read by a President.

2 Senator Huddleston. That was the plan itself.

3 Mr. Angleton. The plan itself, but it had its own --

4 Senator Huddleston. The paper went up the hill and back.

5 Mr. Angleton. It had certain impact.

6 Senator Huddleston. The paper went up the hill and back,
7 but the plan, the activities related in that plan, in fact did
8 continue.

9 Mr. Angleton. I do not think all the activity continued.
10 I think there were a number of activities of the Bureau that
11 fitted within the jurisdiction of the Bureau that were not
12 rezoned.

13 Senator Huddleston. But there were mail openings.

14 Mr. Angleton. The mail openings were within the Agency.

15 Senator Huddleston. Wiretaps, surreptitious entries.

16 Mr. Angleton. I do not think there were any surreptitious
17 entries, but I am giving an unqualified answer, but I understand
18 your point, sir.

19 Senator Huddleston. But I think the evidence indicates
20 there were, but that is all, Mr. Chairman.

21 The Chairman. Yes, it is almost as though from the state of
22 evidence to date that the President was really an irrelevancy.

23 Tomorrow, we will meet again at 10:00 o'clock, and our
24 witness tomorrow is Mr. Charles Brennan of the FBI.

25 Thank you, Mr. Angleton, for your testimony.

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Mr. Angleton. Thank you, Senator.

(Whereupon, at 1:05 o'clock p.m., the Select Committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock a.m., Thursday, September 25, 1975.)